# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC---OFF

Bifo K

#### The 1AC is a double turn that critiques competition and winning, but then required negation to win the ballot---vote neg to reject teams that maintaint he competitive structure of debate

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 165-7]

Although I am persuaded that suicide is a problem of great importance for our times, my focus is not on the impressive increase in the number of people who commit or try to commit suicide, but on the particular significance that the act is coming to acquire at the social and cultural level.

An epidemic of unhappiness is spreading across the planet, while capital absolutism is asserting its right to unfettered control of our lives. As bio-semiocapitalism infiltrates the nervous cells of conscious sensible organisms, it inoculates in them a thanato-political rationale, a morbid sentiment which is progressively taking hold of the collective unconscious, culture and sensibility. The biopolitical effect of semiocapitalism (better said: the thanatological effect of semiocapitalism) is essentially the capture of cognitive activity, and the subjection of the faculty of expression of the linguistic animal to the sleepless, aggressive dynamics of the labour market.

Language is captured by the networked machine and turned into an essentially productive activity. Herein lies the trap: people are encouraged to consider their linguistic competence as factors of economic competition, and to manage and invest in them as such. Creativity, expressiveness, affection, emotion – the human soul, in other words – are considered to be productive factors, and consequently, they are evaluated according to standards of productivity. Exploitation, competition, precariousness, redundancy are not perceived as the effects of a conflictual social relationship, but are internalized as deficiencies of the self, as personal inadequacies. The unceasing restructuring of the organization of work is perceived as humiliation and brutality.

Only non-involvement and the ability to remain extraneous, to refuse any identification with one’s job and with one’s working condition, only a radical rejection of the ethics of responsibility, might offer workers the possibility of navigating a way out from this productivity blackmail.

Unfortunately, the ethics of responsibility, the phoney discourse on participation and collaboration, are prevailing in today’s political and cultural life. We invest our psychic energies and our expectations into work because our intellectual and affective life is poor, because we are depressed, anxious and insecure. So we are trapped. The industrial worker who was obliged to repeat the same gesture a thousand times every day had no reason to identify with her work – so she invested her psychological energies into solidarity with colleagues, and her mind was free to hate the assembly line, and to entertain thoughts that had nothing to do with her daily slavery. Conversely, cognitive workers have been lured into the trap of creativity: their expectations are submitted to the productivity blackmail because they are obliged to identify their soul (the linguistic and emotional core of their activity) with their work. Social conflicts and dissatisfaction are perceived as psychological failures whose effect is the destruction of self-esteem.

The French psychoanalyst Cristophe Dejours has written widely about this trap. In La Souffrance au travail he approaches a phenomenon which has been almost completely neglected by sociologists and psychologists alike: that of suicide in the workplace. He observes that, in the past, work and suicide had little in common. Industrial workers did suffer the separation between their productive activity and their mental life, but this suffering forced them to look beyond daytime work and to invest their psychic energy in solidarity. For cognitive workers, particularly in conditions of precariousness, solidarity is rare. Everyone feels alone, pushed to compete, at the mercy of precariousness.

#### That value system is directly responsible for a hypercompetitive climate that results in mass inequality, immiseration and internalization of failure

Monbiot 16 [George Monbiot is the author of the bestselling books The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order and Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain, as well as the investigative travel books Poisoned Arrows, Amazon Watershed and No Man's Land. His latest book is Feral: Searching for Enchantment on the ­Frontiers of Rewilding (being published in paperback as Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life), Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems, Guardian, 4-1-2016, Accessible Online at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot] 7-13-2016

Imagine if the people of the Soviet Union had never heard of communism. The ideology that dominates our lives has, for most of us, no name. Mention it in conversation and you’ll be rewarded with a shrug. Even if your listeners have heard the term before, they will struggle to define it. Neoliberalism: do you know what it is? Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power. It has played a major role in a remarkable variety of crises: the financial meltdown of 2007‑8, the offshoring of wealth and power, of which the Panama Papers offer us merely a glimpse, the slow collapse of public health and education, resurgent child poverty, the epidemic of loneliness, the collapse of ecosystems, the rise of Donald Trump. But we respond to these crises as if they emerge in isolation, apparently unaware that they have all been either catalysed or exacerbated by the same coherent philosophy; a philosophy that has – or had – a name. What greater power can there be than to operate namelessly? Inequality is recast as virtuous. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. So pervasive has neoliberalism become that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology. We appear to accept the proposition that this utopian, millenarian faith describes a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power. Neoliberalism sees competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It maintains that “the market” delivers benefits that could never be achieved by planning. Attempts to limit competition are treated as inimical to liberty. Tax and regulation should be minimised, public services should be privatised. The organisation of labour and collective bargaining by trade unions are portrayed as market distortions that impede the formation of a natural hierarchy of winners and losers. Inequality is recast as virtuous: a reward for utility and a generator of wealth, which trickles down to enrich everyone. Efforts to create a more equal society are both counterproductive and morally corrosive. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. We internalise and reproduce its creeds. The rich persuade themselves that they acquired their wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages – such as education, inheritance and class – that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances. Never mind structural unemployment: if you don’t have a job it’s because you are unenterprising. Never mind the impossible costs of housing: if your credit card is maxed out, you’re feckless and improvident. Never mind that your children no longer have a school playing field: if they get fat, it’s your fault. In a world governed by competition, those who fall behind become defined and self-defined as losers. Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us Among the results, as Paul Verhaeghe documents in his book What About Me? are epidemics of self-harm, eating disorders, depression, loneliness, performance anxiety and social phobia. Perhaps it’s unsurprising that Britain, in which neoliberal ideology has been most rigorously applied, is the loneliness capital of Europe. We are all neoliberals now.

### 1NC---OFF

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#### Our interpretation is that affirmatives must be topical to win the ballot.

#### “Resolved” before colon denotes a formal resolution

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>; GR]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Prohibitions” are laws forbidding actions

Garner ’19 [Bryan A; Editor in Chief of Black’s Law Dictionary; Westlaw, Black's Law Dictionary, Eleventh Edition, “Prohibitions”]

prohibition (15c) 1. A law or order that forbids a certain action; PROSCRIPTION (1).

#### “Anti-trust law” is controlled by the federal government

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Any non-resolutional interpretation collapses contestability---there are infinite potential interpretations that overstretch negative research burderns

#### The impact is procedural fairness---it’s a precondition for any benefits of the activity

**Dascal** ’**11** [Marcelo and Amnon Knoll; May 18th; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University, B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Sao Paulo; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University; Argumentation: Cognition and Community, "'Cognitive systemic dichotomization' in public argumentation and controversies," p. 20-25; GR]

He opposes positions whose ‘exclusionist’ outlook rejects the normative approach to the political sphere on the grounds that “normative statements can never be subjected to a reasonable discussion” (ibid.: 2), because—he argues—the discussion of politics “is an area of vital interest to all of us and should clearly not be excluded from argumentative reasonableness” (ibid.: 3)—a view with which we are prone to agree. Nevertheless, he admits that in the present situation critical discussion is far from being systematically and successfully applied to that vital area: “In representative democracies, however, the out-comes of the political process tend to be predominantly the product of negotiations be-tween political leaders rather than the result of a universal and mutual process of deliberative disputation” (ibid.). Political debates, therefore, are ‘quasi-discussions’, i.e., “monologues calculated only to win the audience’s consent to one’s own views”, rather than ‘genuine discussions’, i.e., serious attempts to have an intellectual exchange, which is typical of critical discussions (ibid.). In order to overcome this situation, “democracy should always have promoted such a critical discussion of standpoints as a central aim. Only if this is the case can stimulating participation in political discourse enhance the quality of democracy" (ibid.). This can be achieved, however, only by following “the dialectical rules for argumentative discourse that make up a code of conduct for political discourse [and] are therefore of crucial importance to giving substance to the ideal of participatory democracy” (ibid.: 4); thereby fully acknowledging that “education in processing argumentation in a critical discussion is indispensable for a democratic society (van Eemeren 1995: 145-146).

The reasons provided for the failure of the adoption of the critical discussion model in reality ranges from a general allusion to human nature (“in real-life contexts, it has to be taken into account that human interaction is not always automatically 'naturally' and fully oriented toward the ideal of dialectical reasonableness "; van Eemeren 2010: 4) to specific political sphere argumentation handicaps (unwillingness of people “to subject their thinking to critical scrutiny”; “vested interest in particular outcome”; “inequality in power and resources; “different levels of critical skills”; and “a practical demand for an immediate settlement”; van Eemeren 2010: 4). Although these causes may have some explanatory value in some cases, in our opinion their modus operandi is not accounted for and, what is more important, they do not cover the full spectrum of challenges that the successful use of critical discussion in the public and political spheres must face, as we have seen (cf. sections 2 and 3).

No wonder that van Eemeren himself raises the question “whether maintaining the dialectical ideal of critical discussion in political and other real-life contexts is not utopian” (ibid.), to which he replies by admitting that "[t]he ideal of a critical discussion is by definition not a description of any kind of reality but sets a theoretical standard that can be used for heuristic, analytic and evaluative purpose” (ibid.). This ideal seems to be so inspiring that it remains valid as a pure theoretical ideal, “even if the argumentative discourse falls short of the dialectical ideal” (ibid.).

In the light of the substantial gap between the normative ideal and the actual practices of public and political argumentation that PD’s description and explanation provides, a number of doubts arise: Are there structural, rather than merely contingent obstacles in idealized critical discussion that prevents even its approximate use in the public sphere? Can a theory that claims to be a praxis based normative system fulfill its promise if it sets up a threshold that no one who tries to apply it to the public sphere can reach? Doesn’t the very fact that argumentation is excessively idealized in the model PD proposes cause the gap by distancing people concerned by public issues from argumentation at all? All these doubts suggest that a powerful structural phenomenon like the existence of CSDs in the public sphere is perhaps overlooked by PD and requires, for its overcoming, a radically different approach.

4.2 Discrepancies between the PD approach and reasonable argumentation in the public sphere

The discrepancies in question have to do with basic parameters relevant to every argumentative process, namely:

(A) The discussants’ goals and targets: what do they expect to achieve through the argumentation process and what is it capable of providing.

(B) The preconditions for initiating a critical discussion: what are the discussants presumed to know and accept of these preconditions.

(C) The argumentative process that is supposed to lead to the achievement of the discussants’ goals.

(D) The influence of context and agents on the argumentative process.

4.2.1 Goals

Assuming that argumentation is a voluntary endeavor, the parties are presumed to engage in it if and only if: (i) the process will serve their goals; (ii) these goals cannot be achieved by different, better means.

PD describes as follows the aim of engaging in an argumentative process:

Argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint by making an appeal to the other party's reasonableness. (van Eemeren 2010: 1, with reference to van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 11-18)

The difference of opinion is resolved when the antagonist accepts the protagonist's viewpoint on the basis of the arguments advanced or when the protagonist abandons his viewpoint as a result of the critical responses of the antagonist. (van Eemeren 2010: 33)

Simply put, the basic assumption is that a critical discussion’s aim consists in putting forth a certain position by one of the parties for the critical examination of the other, who calls it into question. The latter undertakes to refute the former’s position, while its proponent is committed to defend it. Four stages (see below) are supposed to ensure a valid performance of the refutation and defense tasks. The essential point is that at the end of the four stages the parties clearly agree whether the proponent’s position has been refuted or not and, accordingly, change their position (either retracting it or withdrawing from his questioning). In ‘mixed’ disagreements, in which the antagonist not only questions but also puts forth an opposed position, the same process takes place sequentially, i.e., at first one side (A) attacks trying to refute the other’s (B) position, and after this stage is concluded, they switch roles and the second side (B) proceeds to attack the first (A) in the same fashion.

Regardless of whether the described process is indeed capable to yield a conclusive decision about the refutation of a position, and of whether the linearity of the refutation process makes sense, it is obvious that debates in the public sphere are for the most part ‘mixed’. Furthermore, in so far as these debates involve dichotomous positions (rather than just opposed ones), it is necessary that at the end of the PD process one of the parties accept the position of the other.

It is also worth noticing that, contrary to deliberative democracy approaches, which in some cases approve the attempt to reach agreement in a (public) debate as a form of justification of political systems, PD claims that it is not a consensus theory at all. Instead, it conceives itself as a theory based on Popper’s critical rationality, i.e., as having as its principal goal to provide each party with the means—i.e., refutation attempts—to test critically its position:

[T]he conception of reasonableness upheld in pragma-dialectics insights from critical rationalist epistemology and utilitarian ethics conjoin … The intersubjective acceptability we attribute to the procedure, which is eventually expected to lend conventional validity to the procedure, is primarily based on its instrumentality in doing the job it is intended to do: re-solving a difference of opinion. … This means that, philosophically speaking, the rationale for accepting the pragma-dialectical procedure is pragmatic—more precisely, utilitarian [italics in quoted text]. … However, based on Popper's falsification idea, this is a ‘negative’ and not ‘positive’, utilitarianism. … Rather than maximization of agreement, minimization of disagreement is to be aimed for. (van Eemeren 2010: 34)

The distinction between maximization of agreement and minimization of disagreement purports to stress that PD doesn’t view agreement as the suitable end of the process, but just as “an intermediate step on the way to new, and more advanced, disagreements” (van Eemeren 2010: 26n). Nevertheless, no explanation is given of how these “more advanced disagreements” are engendered as a part of the dynamics of the critical process, nor what is the role or value of such disagreements in the public sphere or elsewhere. This may be due to the fact that PD’s ‘critical discussion’ is not tuned to the generation of new positions or ideas but only to the testing of extant ones, thus echoing once again Popper, now in his focus on the justification rather than on the discovery of theories (see sections 4.2.4 and 5).

In any case, it is quite clear that the only practical result of the critical discussion à la PD of opposed positions on a public issue is to determine whether one discussant succeeded in refuting the other’s position, thus obtaining the adversary’s agreement, who will then share his/her position, at least for some time. In this respect, PD’s critical discussion is close to Habermas’s ‘reasonable argumentation’, whose aim is to reach consensus.15 In spite of the apparent difference between a critical examination of a position aiming at its refutation or at its acceptance, even van Eemeren admits, to some extent, their similarity. He points out that “the pragma-dialectical procedure deals only with ‘first order’ conditions for resolving differences of opinion on the merits by means of critical discussion” (van Eemeren 2010: 34), and stresses that there are ‘higher order’ conditions, ‘internal’ and ‘external’, that are “beyond the agent’s control”, conditions that are similar to Habermas’s “ideal speech conditions” (van Eemeren 2010: 35n). Anyhow, whether according to PD the main goal of the critical discussion process in the public alliance is to create the opportunity for refutation or for agreement (meaning that one of the discussants acknowledges that his position is wrong), the essential assumption of this process is that the participants in it in the public sphere (or elsewhere) must be aware that one of them holds a wrong position and will have to explicitly acknowledge this.

Is such a goal, especially when conceived as the ultimate aim of the proposed argumentative process, feasible and acceptable in the public sphere?

In our opinion, there are at least four reasons for arguing that it is a utopian, hence unacceptable goal, if one takes seriously what should be expected from argumentative practice and theory in the public sphere. First, because PD deserves a critique similar to the one leveled against the Popperian version of critical rationalism it espouses,16 which defends a theory of knowledge “without a knowing subject” (Popper 1972); obviously, such a-contextual position becomes even more problematic if applied to the public and political spheres, where it must operate in a context essentially involved with practical rationality. Second, due to its analogy with theories such as Habermas’s that were discussed in this section as well as in 2.2—an analogy that deserves additional criticism because, unlike Habermasianism, PD overlooks the relationship between the political and public context and argumentative practice. Third, because of PD’s total overlooking of the role of CSDs in public argumentation (cf. 4.2.2). And fourth, due to unilateral value judgments of positions in the public sphere, which lead to simplistic criteria of refutation or acceptance in a domain where complexity is the rule (cf. 2.1.1 and 4.2.3).

(ii) Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that the refutation goal as claimed by PD is central, feasible, acceptable, and useful in public argumentation. Aren’t there better ways to achieve this goal?

The refutation and defense moves stipulated by the PD critical discussion model include, on the one side, the antagonist’s critical remarks or demands and on the other, the proponent’s replies. We believe that it must be assumed that neither the critique nor the replies are previously known to the contenders, which is why they have an interest in engage in the argumentation process: presumably, the expression of both, counter-arguments and defensive-arguments, is good to both sides. In spite of its usefulness in certain situations, this kind of exchange does not amount to the full manifestation of the dialectical critical process, wherein the context and co-text of the dialectical exchange, as well as the cognitive interaction that takes place and evolves throughout the exchange, play a decisive role in the design and ‘inner’ justification of each of the participants’ moves. Argumentation strategies that take into account these resources and make full use of their potential are no doubt setting up another, broader span of goals for the argumentative process, and are more likely to achieve these goals more effectively than they certainly would achieve their PD more limited counterparts (cf. 4.2.4 and 5).

4.2.2 Preconditions

The ideal PD critical discussion can only be realized if some preconditions are satisfied. The most important ones are a) a clear-cut identification of the standpoint that provokes the disagreement, b) the decision of the parties to engage in a discussion, and c) the participants’ commitment to obey the procedural rules. As we shall see, these preconditions share a common assumption, which calls into question the feasibility of using critical discussion in the public sphere.

(A) This precondition assumes that it is possible to isolate rigorously the subject matter of a critical discussion, so as to conduct a focused discussion that makes use only of relevant arguments. This precondition is quite strict, for whenever both discussants defend contrary standpoints, their disagreement should be treated as two separate fully fledged discussions: “… if another discussion begins, it must go through the same stages again—from confrontation stage to concluding stage” (van Eemeren 2010: 10n).

(B) This precondition subordinates the decision to engage in the discussion to the evaluation that the discussants share enough common ground to pursue it adequately: “After the parties have decided that there is enough common ground to conduct a discussion …” (van Eemeren 2010: 33).

(C) This precondition stresses the ‘contractual’ character of a critical discussion, which requires explicit mutual commitments by the discussants. Its rationale is that without such commitments the aim of the critical discussion, i.e., the resolution of the difference of opinions, will not be achieved, which makes engaging in the discussion pointless: “There is no point in venturing to resolve a difference … if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point, which may include procedural commitments as well as substantive agreement” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 60).

These ‘first order’ preconditions, as they are labeled in PD (cf. van Eemeren 2010: 33), are the conditions that candidates to participate in a critical discussion must fulfill if they intend to do so and can afford it personally (a ‘second order’ condition) and politically (a ‘third order’ condition).17 In addition, the first order conditions demand from the prospective discussants a clear, distinct, and detailed picture of the scope of the discussion that they are about to engage in. This means not mixing up the various differences of opinion that the discussion may involve, and being able to separate them properly as the subject matter for independent discussions; a further requirement is the anticipated identification of the pieces of the ‘substantive agreement’ forming the starting point in order to ensure that they are sufficient for conducting the discussion up to a satisfactory closure.

### 1NC---OFF

Cap Good

#### Both capitalism and a commitment towards work are key to space col---extinction

Everett 16 (Sean, CEO of Prome Biological Intelligence, a global biotechnology company, editor of Medium’s news outlet dedicated to space colonialization titled “The Mission”, BS Mathematics & Actuarial Science, MBA from UChicago,“Humanity’s Extinction Event Is Coming” https://medium.com/the-mission/humanitys-extinction-event-is-coming-c0f84f1803f)

But the reality is that an asteroid impact, a change in our magnetic field, or the rising temperature of Earth’s climate are all events that we currently cannot escape. There is no back-up plan. We are, for better or worse, tied to the fate of this planet. As history has shown, that’s not a good fate to be tied to. In fact on September 7, 2016 a 30-foot asteroid flew between the Earth and the Moon. Our most powerful instruments only detected it with two days notice. Two days. If the asteroid was only 1000-foot wide, it would destroy all human life and we’d have no back-up to get out of it. Even the White House is worried about it. Five, yes five, major extinction events have occurred on our planet that we know about. We’re due for another. And when that happens, what’s our alternative? You can’t move to another house. You can’t buy survival, even with a billion dollars in the bank. The only way out, is up. We must find a way to become multi-planetary if we want to save humanity, your family, and yes, even yourself. Only this can restore the honor we seemed to have lost from the brave days of the 60s, while also ensuring our survival. It’s for the species, folks. And as a species, we have not allowed ourselves the opportunity to blast off for the stars. Only the space race in the 60s when we were afraid enough of a self-inflicted global extinction event (read: nuclear) that we put forth the funding required to launch into orbit and onto our moon. We didn’t have calculators back then, and now we have supercomputers in our pocket, but no one is allowed out of our atmosphere, save for a few communication and spy satellites. Doesn’t that make you mad? It’s not some oppressive government that tells us no. It’s us. We pay our taxes. We elect leaders. Those leaders choose Defense as the primary budget line item, but forget about defending against the forthcoming apocalypse. Funding for NASA in the United States has decreased from 4% of the national budget in the 60s to about 0.5% from 2010 onwards. That’s just the money side. But in order to move past this threshold from our home planet to space and then onto other planets, we need to do two things: Travel there. Survive. Luckily, we can simplify the problem of passing this barrier by sending machines in our place. Like TARS from Interstellar, they can go places humans cannot and explore the environment for habitability and resources, even in particularly hostile conditions. Maybe not black hole hostile, but definitely Mars hostile, as the Curiosity Rover has shown. Only now, with a few bold, private startups are we beginning to see a re-emergence of the space industry. We are about to pass a few very important tests that allow us to explore and visit the cosmos. The first is launching physical things into space. This is the catalyst that will jump start a new space race. Prices of sending cargo are falling dramatically, down to nearly $500 per pound of payload with SpaceX’s Falcon 9 heavy re-usable rocket. Note that the re-usable part is key. We can’t throw away our “space car” every time we Uber it. And once that becomes standard and cost-optimized we might be able to get that down to $10 per pound. Imagine what could happen when it costs the same amount to ship something across town as it does into space. The second, and this is just as important, is the wave of autonomous machines. Tesla has popularized the notion of self-driving cars. SpaceX lands their rocket onto a small barge in the ocean autonomously. Companies are buying startups in the space. Self-driving will be our gift, our talisman, on the quest to save the species by becoming multi-planetary. II. Shipping Ourselves to Space The graph below is from the Founders Fund manifesto, showing the decreasing cost of launching something into space. It begins with the 1960s US-versus-Russia space race and extends to the present day SpaceX-versus-Blue Origin reusable rocket race. The cheapest method we have today is SpaceX’s Falcon series rockets. With the Falcon 9 Heavy, it’s predicted launching cargo into space will be cheaper than ever before, at $750 per pound of payload delivered to low earth orbit (LOE)on an expendable rocket. You have to note here, however, that these statistics are as cheap as possible. It costs more to deliver payload on a non-reusable rocket, and on something that’s further out than LEO, like geosynchronous orbit, or to Mars. For example, based on SpaceX’s published pricing, it would be at least 4x more expensive to deliver far less cargo to Mars. So what happens when we reduce that cost to $10 per pound? Namely, an explosion of startups, much like iOS. Instead of pushing to production for your continuously deployed web and mobile app, we will see future developers push to production by deploying physical things into space. “STAGE” takes on an entirely new meaning for software developers when it means your automated regression tests fail, it could blow up a rocket and hurt people on board. That’s why SpaceX and Blue Origins exist. To make this continuous-deployment-to-space process as cheap and fast as possible. By Elon’s calculations, every 15 minutes. III. Self-Driving Space Explorers The most successful products for space, at least in the beginning, will make money by pushing this stuff into orbit. Things like science experiments and new 3D printers. A company called Made in Space creates a number of these products, including the empty box you see below used for sending things up with Blue Origin. The box shown in gray is a specialized 3D printer that works in zero gravity. Remember how most 3D printers work. It squeezes out a single layer of liquid ooze, and then another, over and over again until it builds up enough vertically that it creates an object. This can be simple plastic or more esoteroic metals. But when you’re “dripping” something, held down in place by gravity, the entire process has to be re-imagined for space. Things in zero-G would just float away. Enter these chaps. There’s also the very real need for oxygen, food, water, and shelter from the harsh elements. Funny how we will end up recreating Maslow’s Heirarchy in every new voyage or planetoid we want to colonize. And space mining is off to the races with the recent announcement of Deep Space Industry’s Prospector-1: Their vision is to extract water from asteroids and use the chemical components to hydrate us, but also as oxygen (breathing) and hydrogen (fuel). To do that, you have to identify candidate asteroids, physically get to them, land and attach, and then do surveying, prospecting, and extraction. In short, you’re going to need some level of self-driving capabilities to make this happen. And wouldn’t it be nice if it “just worked” right out of the box. Unfortunately, in space you don’t have fleets of these space craft, millions of miles of training data, maps, or an internet connection to the cloud so how the heck are deep learning algorithms going to work? I don’t think they will. And that’s what I believe we need a better approach.

#### Long-term trends make growth sustainable- dedev flips their impacts

Brook, et al, 15—professor of environmental sustainability at the University of Tasmania (Barry, with John Asafu-Adjaye, University of Queensland, Linus Blomqvist, Breakthrough Institute, Stewart Brand, Long Now Foundation, Ruth DeFries, Columbia Univeristy, Erle Ellis, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Christopher Foreman, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, David Keith, Harvard University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Martin Lewis, Stanford University, Mark Lynas, Cornell University, Ted Nordhaus, Breakthrough Institute, Roger Pielke, Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder, Rachel Pritzker, Pritzker Innovation Fund, Joyashree Roy, Jadavpur University, Mark Sagoff, George Mason University, Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough Institute, Robert Stone, Filmmaker, and Peter Teague, Breakthrough Institute, “AN ECOMODERNIST MANIFESTO,” <http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto/>, dml)

To say that the Earth is a human planet becomes truer every day. Humans are made from the Earth, and the Earth is remade by human hands. Many earth scientists express this by stating that the Earth has entered a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene, the Age of Humans. As scholars, scientists, campaigners, and citizens, we write with the conviction that knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, Anthropocene. A good Anthropocene demands that humans use their growing social, economic, and technological powers to make life better for people, stabilize the climate, and protect the natural world. In this, we affirm one long-standing environmental ideal, that humanity must shrink its impacts on the environment to make more room for nature, while we reject another, that human societies must harmonize with nature to avoid economic and ecological collapse. These two ideals can no longer be reconciled. Natural systems will not, as a general rule, be protected or enhanced by the expansion of humankind’s dependence upon them for sustenance and well-being. Intensifying many human activities — particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement — so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty. Although we have to date written separately, our views are increasingly discussed as a whole. We call ourselves ecopragmatists and ecomodernists. We offer this statement to affirm and to clarify our views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the service of creating a good Anthropocene. Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters. Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. Personal, economic, and political liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. Historically large numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium orthorium fuel cycle, orfrom hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive. There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shied away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends. The processes of decoupling described above challenge the idea that early human societies lived more lightly on the land than do modern societies. Insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies supported vastly smaller populations. In fact, early human populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today. Consider that a population of no more than one or two million North Americans hunted most of the continent’s large mammals into extinction in the late Pleistocene, while burning and clearing forests across the continent in the process. Extensive human transformations of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the Industrial Revolution. The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human dieoff, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster. Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them: people who depend on firewood and charcoal for fuel cut down and degrade forests; people who eat bush meat for food hunt mammal species to local extirpation. Whether it’s a local indigenous community or a foreign corporation that benefits, it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature. Conversely, modern technologies, by using natural ecosystem flows and services more efficiently, offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere. To embrace these technologies is to find paths to a good Anthropocene. The modernization processes that have increasingly liberated humanity from nature are, of course, double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either. It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems in distant places — the extraction of natural resources has been globalized. But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history. Decoupling human well-being from the destruction of nature requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy. In other cases, humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy. Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment, allowing more room for non-human species. Suburbanization, low-yield farming, and many forms of renewable energy production, in contrast, generally require more land and resources and leave less room for nature. These patterns suggest that humans are as likely to spare nature because it is not needed to meet their needs as they are to spare it for explicit aesthetic and spiritual reasons. The parts of the planet that people have not yet profoundly transformed have mostly been spared because they have not yet found an economic use for them — mountains, deserts, boreal forests, and other “marginal” lands. Decoupling raises the possibility that societies might achieve peak human impact without intruding much further on relatively untouched areas. Nature unused is nature spared. Plentiful access to modern energy is an essential prerequisite for human development and for decoupling development from nature. The availability of inexpensive energy allows poor people around the world to stop using forests for fuel. It allows humans to grow more food on less land, thanks to energy-heavy inputs such as fertilizer and tractors. Energy allows humans to recycle waste water and desalinate sea water to spare rivers and aquifers. It allows humans to cheaply recycle metal and plastic rather than to mine and refine these minerals. Looking forward, modern energy may allow the capture of carbon from the atmosphere to reduce the accumulated carbon that drives global warming. However, for at least the past three centuries, rising energy production globally has been matched by rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Nations have also been slowly decarbonizing — that is, reducing the carbon intensity of their economies — over that same time period. But they have not been doing so at a rate consistent with keeping cumulative carbon emissions low enough to reliably stay below the international target of less than 2 degrees Centigrade of global warming. Significant climate mitigation, therefore, will require that humans rapidly accelerate existing processes of decarbonization. There remains much confusion, however, as to how this might be accomplished. In developing countries, rising energy consumption is tightly correlated with rising incomes and improving living standards. Although the use of many other material resource inputs such as nitrogen, timber, and land are beginning to peak, the centrality of energy in human development and its many uses as a substitute for material and human resources suggest that energy consumption will continue to rise through much if not all of the 21st century. For that reason, any conflict between climate mitigation and the continuing development process through which billions of people around the world are achieving modern living standards will continue to be resolved resoundingly in favor of the latter. Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world’s people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges. Meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technological challenge. By this we mean that even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation. Absent profound technological change there is no credible path to meaningful climate mitigation. While advocates differ in the particular mix of technologies they favor, we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts. The specific technological paths that people might take toward climate mitigation remain deeply contested. Theoretical scenarios for climate mitigation typically reflect their creators’ technological preferences and analytical assumptions while all too often failing to account for the cost, rate, and scale at which low-carbon energy technologies can be deployed. The history of energy transitions, however, suggests that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality (i.e., less carbon-intensive, higher-density) fuels for lower-quality (i.e., more carbon-intensive, lower density) ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future. Transitioning to a world powered by zero-carbon energy sources will require energy technologies that are power dense and capable of scaling to many tens of terawatts to power a growing human economy. Most forms of renewable energy are, unfortunately, incapable of doing so. The scale of land use and other environmental impacts necessary to power the world on biofuels or many other renewables are such that we doubt they provide a sound pathway to a zero-carbon low-footprint future. High-efficiency solar cells produced from earth-abundant materials are an exception and have the potential to provide many tens of terawatts on a few percent of the Earth’s surface. Present-day solar technologies will require substantial innovation to meet this standard and the development of cheap energy storage technologies that are capable of dealing with highly variable energy generation at large scales. Nuclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy. However, a variety of social, economic, and institutional challenges make deployment of present-day nuclear technologies at scales necessary to achieve significant climate mitigation unlikely. A new generation of nuclear technologies that are safer and cheaper will likely be necessary for nuclear energy to meet its full potential as a critical climate mitigation technology. In the long run, next-generation solar, advanced nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion represent the most plausible pathways toward the joint goals of climate stabilization and radical decoupling of humans from nature. If the history of energy transitions is any guide, however, that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits. Hydroelectric dams, for example, may be a cheap source of low-carbon power for poor nations even though their land and water footprint is relatively large. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage can likewise provide substantial environmental benefits over current fossil or biomass energies. The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies, both within nations and between them, though international collaboration and competition, and within a broader framework for global modernization and development. We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being. Humans will always materially depend on nature to some degree. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. The case for a more active, conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments. Current and future generations could survive and prosper materially on a planet with much less biodiversity and wild nature. But this is not a world we want nor, if humans embrace decoupling processes, need to accept. What we are here calling nature, or even wild nature, encompasses landscapes, seascapes, biomes and ecosystems that have, in more cases than not, been regularly altered by human influences over centuries and millennia. Conservation science, and the concepts of biodiversity, complexity, and indigeneity are useful, but alone cannot determine which landscapes to preserve, or how. In most cases, there is no single baseline prior to human modification to which nature might be returned. For example, efforts to restore landscapes to more closely resemble earlier states (“indigeneity”) may involve removing recently arrived species (“invasives”) and thus require a net reduction in local biodiversity. In other circumstances, communities may decide to sacrifice indigeneity for novelty and biodiversity. Explicit efforts to preserve landscapes for their non-utilitarian value are inevitably anthropogenic choices. For this reason, all conservation efforts are fundamentally anthropogenic. The setting aside of wild nature is no less a human choice, in service of human preferences, than bulldozing it. Humans will save wild places and landscapes by convincing our fellow citizens that these places, and the creatures that occupy them, are worth protecting. People may choose to have some services — like water purification and flood protection — provided for by natural systems, such as forested watersheds, reefs, marshes, and wetlands, even if those natural systems are more expensive than simply building water treatment plants, seawalls, and levees. There will be no one-size-fits all solution. Environments will be shaped by different local, historical, and cultural preferences. While we believe that agricultural intensification for land-sparing is key to protecting wild nature, we recognize that many communities will continue to opt for land-sharing, seeking to conserve wildlife within agricultural landscapes, for example, rather than allowing it to revert to wild nature in the form of grasslands, scrub, and forests. Where decoupling reduces pressure on landscapes and ecosystems to meet basic human needs, landowners, communities, and governments still must decide to what aesthetic or economic purpose they wish to dedicate those lands. Accelerated decoupling alone will not be enough to ensure more wild nature. There must still be a conservation politics and a wilderness movement to demand more wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes will require a deeper emotional connection to them. We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. Technological progress is not inevitable. Decoupling environmental impacts from economic outputs is not simply a function of market-driven innovation and efficient response to scarcity. The long arc of human transformation of natural environments through technologies began well before there existed anything resembling a market or a price signal. Thanks to rising demand, scarcity, inspiration, and serendipity, humans have remade the world for millennia. Technological solutions to environmental problems must also be considered within a broader social, economic, and political context. We think it is counterproductive for nations like Germany and Japan, and states like California, to shutter nuclear power plants, recarbonize their energy sectors, and recouple their economies to fossil fuels and biomass. However, such examples underscore clearly that technological choices will not be determined by remote international bodies but rather by national and local institutions and cultures. Too often, modernization is conflated, both by its defenders and critics, with capitalism, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions. What we refer to when we speak of modernization is the long-term evolution of social, economic, political, and technological arrangements in human societies toward vastly improved material well-being, public health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom. Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty and hard agricultural labor, women from chattel status, children and ethnic minorities from oppression, and societies from capricious and arbitrary governance. Greater resource productivity associated with modern sociotechnological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature. Modernizing processes are far from complete, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. Decoupling of human welfare from environmental impacts will require a sustained commitment to technological progress and the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. Accelerated technological progress will require the active, assertive, and aggressive participation of private sector entrepreneurs, markets, civil society, and the state. While we reject the planning fallacy of the 1950s, we continue to embrace a strong public role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards. And international collaboration on technological innovation and technology transfer is essential in the areas of agriculture and energy. We offer this statement in the belief that both human prosperity and an ecologically vibrant planet are not only possible but also inseparable. By committing to the real processes, already underway, that have begun to decouple human well-being from environmental destruction, we believe that such a future might be achieved. As such, we embrace an optimistic view toward human capacities and the future. It is our hope that this document might contribute to an improvement in the quality and tenor of the dialogue about how to protect the environment in the 21st century. Too often discussions about the environment have been dominated by the extremes, and plagued by dogmatism, which in turn fuels intolerance. We value the liberal principles of democracy, tolerance, and pluralism in themselves, even as we affirm them as keys to achieving a great Anthropocene. We hope that this statement advances the dialogue about how best to achieve universal human dignity on a biodiverse and thriving planet.

#### Cap solves war

Dafoe 14, Political Science and International Economics (Allan & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions.

**Transition would cause mass instability- decks responses to pandemics and asteroids**

**Brannen, 16**—Raymond Brannen, April 5th, “You Can't Save The World Without Civilization” *The Future Primaeval*, http://thefutureprimaeval.net/you-cant-save-the-world-without-civilization/, Date Accessed: 5-22

Impact of civilizational decline or collapse Now that I’ve thoroughly depressed you with apocalyptism, let’s make matters even darker by discussing the implications for humanitarians. Examining the worst-case scenarios is like exposure therapy: it will start training you to have the emotional grit that’s necessary to tackle civilization-scale questions. An **economic crash** like the 2008 financial crisis or worse would be very **damaging** to philanthropy. Disposable incomes would be **wiped out**. Charitable giving would crash. Additionally, all of the effective altruist, existential risk, and AI risk organizations would face budget cuts or be placed on the **chopping block**. “Earning to give” would be forgotten in favor of earning to eat. A total, global, **economic collapse** might reduce AI risk and some technological risks, like nanotechnology. But it would also have an **immense cost**, based on societal collapses that have already happened. An account from the **Soviet Union**: **St. Petersburg was a shock**. There was a sense of despair that hung in the winter air. There were old women standing around in spontaneous open-air flea markets trying to sell toys that probably belonged to their grandchildren, to buy something to eat. Middle-class people could be seen digging around in the trash. Everyone's savings were wiped out by hyperinflation. The collapse of **Bosnia** during the breakup of Yugoslavia was even worse: After a month or two, gangs started operating, destroying everything. Hospitals, for example, turned into slaughterhouses. There was no more police. About 80 percent of the hospital staff were gone. I got lucky. My family at the time was fairly large (15 people in a large house, six pistols, three AKs), and we survived (most of us, at least). The Americans dropped MREs every 10 days to help blockaded cities. This was never enough. Some—very few—had gardens. It took three months for the first rumors to spread of men dying from hunger and cold. We removed all the doors, the window frames from abandoned houses, ripped up the floors and burned the furniture for heat. Many died from diseases, especially from the water (two from my own family). We drank mostly rainwater, ate pigeons and even rats. Sarajevo during the Bosnian War These situations sound pretty bad. The scenarios are not “existential risks,” because people are still alive. But these collapses would be **disastrous** for accomplishing any human goals. All the existential risk projects that require technology would become **impossible**, like asteroid prevention or dealing with pandemics. Scrabbling to survive without food and without rule of law, humans would lose their long-term orientation and ability to widely coordinate. During a civilizational collapse, the **downward trajectory** could be very messy, and countries could burn through **global resources** or use weapons unwisely during the resulting **destabilization**. We could see a **feedback loop** where destabilization leads to greater destabilization. Even if only Western civilization collapses, then there will be no way to address technological risks emanating from Russia or China.

#### global repression of ethnic minorities

Klein et al. ’16 (Graig R. Klein is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Security Studies at New Jersey City University. Carla Martinez Machain is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kansas State University. Efe Tokdemir is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University. “It’s the Economy, Stupid (But Blame Minority Groups),” 27 October 2016, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/10/27/its-the-economy-stupid-but-blame-minority-groups/)

In an effort to rally political support during times of economic stagnation and decline, leaders may choose to exploit in-group–out-group tension as a means of avoiding, rather than tackling, economic problem(s). We have observed leaders around the world repressing ethnic minorities as a way to stay in power – see examples from Yugoslavia, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Thailand, Nigeria, and Spain. Last year, the June parliamentary elections in Turkey ended a 13-year single-party government rule by President Erdogan’s incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP). AKP announced new elections (held four months later) rather than build a coalition government. In between elections, AKP ceased conciliatory policy toward the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (a policy that was blamed for the loss of nationalistic voters). Instead, the government replaced negotiations with bellicose rhetoric. This included accusing the ethnic Kurdish minority’s People’s Democratic Party (HDP) of terrorist propaganda, bombing urban districts in Kurdish regions, and harassing news media that was critical of the government. The opposition claims this was an attempt to rally nationalist sentiment and divert public attention from accusations of AKP fraud and Turkey’s poor economic performance. It appears to have been effective. As a result of the November 2015 elections, the AKP retained power by winning 49% of the vote share. These cases and additional research detail leaders’ strategic domestic diversion decisions. Our research addresses how severe repression must be in order to divert the public’s attention and criticism away from the economy (and toward in-group cohesion and out-group threat), and on strategic responses from the minority groups. Diversionary Conflict Diversionary war theory generally suggests that state leaders facing low popularity or a depressed economy initiate conflict overseas to divert the public’s attention and rally support – especially when there is an upcoming election. For example, (see here, here, and here) when inflation or unemployment is high, US presidents use aggressive foreign policy to divert the public’s attention away from the underperforming economy and towards foreign policy success. Recent work argues that leaders may also demonize and repress domestic minorities as a way to divert. In two research articles (Martinez Machain & Rosenberg and Klein & Tokdemir), we explore the strategic interactions between leaders with diversionary incentives and potential target domestic minority groups. Domestic diversion is rare because there are other, more efficient ways (such as general repression or foreign conflict) to rally support. In order for domestic diversion to be an effective option for maintaining power, the minority group has to be perceived as a threat. It is not always easy to identify such a group.

## ON

### 1NC---AT: Solvency

#### Academic theorizing fails to promote material change

Gunnell 9 (John G., Ph.D. in political science, is a Professor in Political Science and Political Theory at UCDavis UNISA, "Speaking politically: politics and the academic intellectual in the United States", April 7, 2009)

POLITICAL THEORY AS A METAPRACTICE We often fail to recognise how much contemporary political theory bears the genetic imprint of its nineteenth-century origins**. Political science and political theory in the United States originated as a surrogate for religion and moral philosophy, but what scholars have failed to figure out is exactly how this academic community can have** practical significance**.** Michael Walzer, for example, has advanced the idea of the theorist as a `connected critic' who, while seeking necessary `critical distance', enters the `mainstream' and pursues criticism as `interpretation' and `opposition' and seeks to mediate between `specialists and commoners' or `elite and mass' (1987; 1988). Walzer acknowledges the conflict between the claim of philosophy to `objective truths' and the authority of the political community but, as with so many conceptual solutions, he fails to situate this image. None of Walzer's many historical examples, from the Hebrew prophets to Michel Foucault, touch directly upon the circumstances of contemporary institutionalised academic metapractices. **Charles Lindblom has grappled intensively with the problem of whether social science can provide `usable knowledge' (Cohen and Lindblom 1979) and how social scientific inquiry can contribute to social change (1990), with what might be called the problem of relating knowing about to knowing how, but in the end, the issue seems to come down to the place and role of the university in contemporary society**. Russell Jacoby has argued that the American university has come to function as a sort of `brain drain' which has attracted but also absorbed and neutralised the potential public intellectual, particularly on the Left (1988). This is a provocative claim, but it is based on a romanticised image of the [14] existence and impact of public intellectuals in American political life. Thomas Bender, for example, has more carefully explored the impact of the modern university on the participation of academics in public life (1993). Those attracted to the university seldom really had a stomach for political life and dirty hands. Jacoby's more recent analysis, in The Chronicle of Higher Education, probably hits close to the mark. He suggests that the university is at once politicised and apolitical (1996). **Academicians take positions on a variety of political and moral issues but in a universe and** language that is quite disconnected from practical politics**. In the academy there is a kind of virtual politics represented in discussions of feminism, liberalism, citizen identity and the like, but this seldom reaches the political world.** Allan Bloom's claim, and lament, that Leftist ideology has taken over the university assumes that the university (1988) is a staging zone for political education, but this would be difficult to sustain empirically. **And despite abstractly voiced concerns about, and attestations to, political relevance, most scholarly activity is generated and propelled by academic concerns and professionalism. A dominant theme in many humanistic fields such as literary criticism is that they are, in one way or another, a form of political action or that they can exercise significant influence on public life (Lentrecchia 1983; Norris 1985). Most of these claims are advanced by individuals who fancy themselves radical and oppositional thinkers. At the same time conservatives, such as Bloom, Roger Kimball (1990), Dinesh D'Sousa (1991), Martin Anderson (1992) and Lynne Cheney (1995), protest the influence of these individuals in the American academy and warn of their corrosive impact on public life and morals. What these commentators have in common, however, is the belief that what takes place in the university really has consequences, but specifying, or determining, the exact nature of these consequences is another matter**. Claims, such as those of Isaac and myself, about the alienation of political theory from politics as well as arguments, such as Jacoby's, about the apolitical character of the academy are countered in a number of ways. **One response is to point to what is sometimes called the `cross-over' phenomenon, that is, instances of academics entering political life or politicians moving to the academy, but this fails to take account of what the metapractical dream has been all about, that is, to have authority over practice without joining it.** And it has other difficulties attached to it. **While `crossover' may seem intuitively significant** - cases like those of Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, Hubert Humphrey in one direction, and those of Jimmy Carter and similar instances in the other direction **-- these are exceptions that do not prove the rule. What these classic cases**, as well as instances of Straussians joining the Reagan and Bush administration or the influence of communitarian liberals and academic advocates of strong democracy in the Clinton White House**, tell us about the general relationship between political theory and politics is that for the most part these realms are actually quite disparate.** They represent more choices between vocations than articulation. We [15] note these incidents because they are so unusual, not because they represent the manner in which political theorists are characteristically involved in politics. **And even though we might wish to think that these are examples of theory leading practice, they probably are closer to instances of practice using theory.** Another line of argument is based on the `trickle-down' hypothesis that the university can and does play, through education and other processes of cultural diffusion, a major role in shaping the public consciousness. Some also subscribe to the view that there are many individual theorists who are actually talking about politics and confronting pressing political problems, both by dealing with the philosophical dimension of these issues and by speaking to and for various concrete and sometimes marginalised constituencies. And there is the further claim that many do not simply give at the office but take their work home and through their individual efforts carry it into the relevant communities. While these are interesting theses, they remain largely at the level of professional folklore. To the extent that they can be demonstrated, they may indicate something about a few individuals but do not tell us very much about the general structural relationship between political theory and politics. **Although it would be interesting to know if and to what extent and in what manner academic discourse does reverberate in the world of social practices, claims about such influence remain largely matters of faith, rhetoric and metapractical fantasy.** There is, however, a more significant point. In instances as diverse as nineteenth-century social science, various images of political science as a policy analysis, critical theory, and Wolin's account of political theory as a vocation, the vision involved transcending the vagaries and unpredictability of individual action and establishing a professional cadre as an institutional social force that would carry authority and inform practice on a systematic basis. What received short-shrift in Isaac's analysis, however, was a consideration of whether political theory actually had anything to say about the events of 1989. I happened to be in Berlin, at an academic conference dealing with the historical origins of modern social science, the day that the `wall' came down. It was a profoundly moving event and, as usual, theorists were in awe at being so proximate to actual politics. What was most striking, however, was the general lack of any sense of the imminence of the event and the inability to provide more that the most mundane explanation of its occurrence.

### 1NC---Policy Focus Good

#### Pragmatic policy reforms can be successful, but require specific goal-oriented approaches---role playing strategy development and learning to draw connections between disparate struggles is key

Lakey ‘13 (George Lakey co-founded Earth Quaker Action Group which just won its five-year campaign to force a major U.S. bank to give up financing mountaintop removal coal mining. Along with college teaching he has led 1,500 workshops on five continents and led activist projects on local, national, and international levels. Among many other books and articles, he is author of “Strategizing for a Living Revolution” in David Solnit’s book Globalize Liberation. 8 skills of a well-trained activist. June 11, 2013. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/8-skills-of-a-well-trained-activist/>)

Why more training now? The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits. With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces. Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training. Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control. Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer? When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly. What is training ready to do for us? Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training: 1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary. 2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator. 3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action. 4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement. 5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways. 6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals. 7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight. 8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours. I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.

#### Understanding the intricacies of politics, the state, and the military is a prerequisite to addressing oppression

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/)

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target.

What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene.

We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both.

I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take.

This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

#### Legislative advocacy changes disability policy and attitudes – empirics prove

Landmark et al 17 (Leena Landmark, Professor at Ohio University. Dalun Zhang, Professor at Texas A&M University. Song Ju, Professor at the University of Cincinnati. Melissa Yi, MS from Texas A&M University. Timothy C. McVey, BA from Ohio University. “Experiences of Disability Advocates and Self-Advocates in Texas”. Journal of Disability Policy Studies 2017, Vol. 27(4) 203–211) swap

Legislative advocacy is a prime channel for disability advocates to affect civil rights and disability-related legislation and policy that leads to improved quality of life for individuals with disabilities. To highlight the current status of disability legislative advocacy, this study examined advocacy experiences based on recent data from one state that involved 113 disability advocates and self-advocates. Analyses were conducted to examine the characteristics of advocates, the causes advocated, leadership positions, level of engagement, and frequency of engagement in the legislative advocacy process. Relations among advocates’ characteristics and advocacy experiences were also examined. Results revealed that individuals with disabilities mostly relied on their peers in the advocacy process, and the type of disability was associated with the causes advocated. In addition, holding a leadership position was associated with engagement in the legislative advocacy process. Quality of life is an important goal for all people. For individuals who have disabilities, the degree to which they are satisfied with their lives may have increased importance because they have not always been afforded the opportunity to live according to their desires (Francis, Blue-Banning, & Turnbull, 2014; Verdugo, Navas, Gomez, & Schalock, 2012). Self-determination, one of the comprising domains of the quality-of-life construct, has been linked to positive adult outcomes for individuals with disabilities. Individuals who possess self-determination tend to achieve greater independent living and employment outcomes than individuals who are not as self-determined (Wehmeyer & Palmer, 2003). As a component element of self-determination, self advocacy is essential for improving quality-of-life outcomes. Self-advocacy (including parent advocacy) and leadership skills have played important roles in the history of special education and disability rights. As early as the 1930s, local groups of parents banded together to obtain educational services for their children with disabilities (Yell, Rogers, & Rogers, 1998). By the 1970s, individuals with developmental disabilities announced they were people first, and the self-advocacy movement was spawned in the United States (Longhurst, 1994). An early victory in the effort to gain services required for independent living was the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited establishments receiving federal funding from discrimination against people with disabilities. One of the greatest victories was the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a civil rights law prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. The advocacy movement has allowed people with disabilities the opportunity to explore their group identity, gain a sense of empowerment, and learn how to stand up for equal rights (Browning, Thorin, & Rhoades, 1984). Landmark legislation such as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (renamed the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act in 1990), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 would not have been enacted without the advocacy efforts of individuals with disabilities and their families. Through legislative advocacy, Americans with disabilities have shaped public policy and made their lives better.

#### Material redress is necessary to break down ableism – theory and deconstruction cannot shift market practices

Vehmas and Watson 14 (Simo Vehmas, Professor of Disability Studies at the University of Helsinki and the president of the Nordic Network on Disability Research, NNDR. Nick Watson, Professor of “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”. Disability & Society, 2014 Vol. 29, No. 4, 638–650, http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/85082/1/85082.pdf) swap

Critical disability studies and justice The influence of CDS and its challenge to the assumption that disability is a uniform condition have enabled the emergence of new ideas on disability. In particular, this has enabled the development of a theory that can take account of not only impairment effects but also can include class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or cultural identities. It has also argued for the re-emergence of a new political identity, one where a solidarity that was previously built on a common single identity is replaced by one that incorporates multiple voices including representatives from across the range of constituencies. The politics that it seeks to develop will be t he ending of the single interest group identity of the disability movement to be replaced by single-issue groups campaigning for different social issues. To paraphrase Lister (1998, 74), if disability and impairment are simply to be ‘deconstructed into a kaleidoscope of shifting identities’ and ableist discourses, there will be no disabled people left to either fight for the right to be, or to be a citizen. If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change. CDS fails to account for the economic basis of disability and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). Markets are not controlled by nor are they subsidiary to culture; ‘as a result they generate economic inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’ (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage.

### 1NC---AT: Representation

#### Public policy engagement is achievable and a strong strategy for achieving representation

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Research acknowledges the importance of direct involvement of people with disabilities in all aspects of policy debates, and civic engagement is one means in which to create or influence change. For people with disabilities, civic engagement can help to create self-efficacy, promote social integration, and develop personal interests (Barnartt et al., 2001; Hahn, 1985; Zola, 2005). Like other citizens, people with disabilities want an equal voice in democratic debates and the opportunity to advocate for change (Barnartt et al., 2001). Such participation and involvement in public policy efforts can have an emancipatory effect, as marginalized groups are able to feel they are part of something, and in turn become more aware of their civic rights and responsibilities (Lewis, 2010). Disability advocate and scholar Jim Charlton cites civic engagement as a vital strategy for people with disabilities to develop a raised consciousness as they engage in grassroots advocacy for change in local communities. The title of his book, Nothing About Us Without Us, is a mantra frequently heard in disability rights movements and calls for people with disabilities to be involved in decisions made about them (Charlton, 2000) Increasing the engagement of people with disabilities will ensure that new policies do not continue the cycles of political marginalization historically experienced by this population.¶ Disability Advocacy ¶ The use of advocacy by people with disabilities has been successful in changing policies and programs, most of which are associated with protests organized by the disability rights movement. A historical analysis of the number of protests by disability organizations between 1972 and 1999 shows growth in political activism over the years (Barnartt & Scotch, 2001). For instance, the group Disabled in Action developed strategies to block traffic to secure accessible public transportation in New York in 1977. That same year several groups of people with disabilities led sit-ins in 10 federal government offices until the government issued regulations for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and in 1988 deaf students at Gallaudet University protested until a deaf president was hired to lead them (Barnartt et al., 2001; Fleischer & Zames, 2001; Shapiro, 1994). In 2003 representatives from a group known as Mad Pride in California received national attention for a hunger strike organized to bring attention to the rights of people with mental health issues (Lewis, 2010). In Chicago, there is a strong history of grassroots disability advocacy being used to elicit change and connect citizens with government. Disability organizations, including Access Living and the Progress Center for Independent Living, have played a significant role in disability policy debates across Illinois. This included efforts toward deinstitutionalization, transportation accessibility, and securing access to sign language interpreters. In addition, the Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities in Chicago has been active in ensuring access around public sidewalks, voting, and schools. Non-profit organizations face legal restrictions on the amount of lobbying they can engage in, but they still manage to make a significant impact in policymaking (Vaughan & Arsneault, 2008). In order to create widespread change, forming relationships between people with disabilities and state representatives is critical because it helps citizens gain power in the policy arena. However, people with disabilities face various barriers to full involvement. Most barriers fall into one of three categories: intrapersonal (skills and competence); interpersonal (team dynamics); or organizational (resources, decision-making processes) (Foster-Fishman, Jimenez, Valenti, & Kelly, 2007). One of the most common barriers is a lack of resources or funds to either purchase assistive devices or make trips to visit official, so having a voice in policy decisions can be challenging. Other barriers that hinder the development of advocacy skills in individuals with disabilities include inaccessible buildings, a lack of training experiences, negative attitudes, and few opportunities to practice learned skills. Increasing safe environments, supporting advocacy trainings, and forming mentor relationships can help facilitate the development of self-advocacy skills for people with disabilities. Technology for People with Disabilities While advocacy has been an essential strategy for promoting the rights and participation of people with disabilities, further efforts are needed to encourage and facilitate people with disabilities in public policy domains. The use of adaptive technology is another vital strategy that empowers people with disabilities to connect with government, as it facilitates communication and allows for full expression in policy debates; and are, at times, the only means by which they can access public debate. Furthermore, people with disabilities often use technology to relate to the real world. This is especially true for people who use augmentative and alternative communication devices as people with severe communication impairments face significant additional barriers in participation, attaining self-determination, and realizing a high quality of life (Light et al., 2007). Research has demonstrated that such technology, when people are appropriately trained to use it, can help people with disabilities overcome barriers to full and equal participation, and develop socio-relational and problem-solving skills (Light et al., 2007; McCarthy et al., 2007). It is imperative that people with disabilities have opportunities for continued training and support in using technology, because increased participation implies a greater range of communication environments (McNaughton & Bryen, 2007). Adaptive technology is vital in allowing people with disabilities full participation in policy debates and the ability to become involved in the decision-making processes about policies that affect how they live in society. Aside from facilitating communication, technology can also be used as an organizational tool, it can help spark discussions about policy, and it can permit people with disabilities to find up-to-date information on government regulations and laws. Though seemingly all positive, some aspects of new technologies create additional barriers for people with disabilities who want to fully engage in civic society. There is a digital divide in society due to the fact that some individuals have access to internet and advanced technology and some do not (Rubaii-Barrett & Wise, 2008). Cost, availability, accessibility features, and lack of knowledge in effective usage are all barriers to people with disabilities taking full advantage of different forms of technology. There are regulations in place that address the issue of inaccessible technology, but states are either unable or unwilling to carry out federal mandates. Instead of focusing on increased spending, lobbying for greater enforcement of existing state and federal policies can be effective in bringing about positive changes in technology for those with disabilities (Rubaii-Barrett & Wise, 2008). Creating equal access to advanced technology for all people will help weaken the digital divide and increase opportunities for individuals with disabilities to become involved in policymaking processes.

# 2NC

## T

### 2NC---AT: Competition Bad

#### This straight turns the aff at the level of form even if they win the content of the 1AC is radical—voting aff requires agreeing with the assumption that following the rules is worse than breaking them, but that act of transgression gains satisfaction from violating the system it indicts. This reifies the coherence of that system—you can’t make the rules of debate less insidious by playing the game, because the act of playing itself affirms the game that brings the rules to life. You should vote neg because considering debate as simply a rule-guided game divests the rules of any authority but that which we grant it.

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In order to understand the conceptual difference, it is important to note that when Baudrillard speaks of the law, he is not referring to law only in the strictly judicial meaning of the term. Baudrillard is rather drawing on a psychoanalytical tradition from Freud and Lacan in which the concept of law stands for any kind of social regularity, such as prohibitions, norms, values, morals, conventions, and so on, that structures the way we act and construct meaning in society. Law constitutes the social order of society.

Viewed from the perspective of an individual immersed in the daily life of society, the difference between the law of society and the rule of the game is a difference between necessity and arbitrariness. The law consists not only of a series of prohibitions and norms. It carries also an account of the justification and rationality of the law. The law tells us not only what we should and should not do; it tells us also why we should or should not do this or that. The law claims to be valid and necessary regardless of the opinions held by the individual subject included in the law. The necessity of law is founded on transcendence. This may be the transcendence of a religious order, a principle of reason and rationality, or a system of tradition. In any case the law justifies itself with reference to some order beyond the immediate content of itself.

Contrary to the law, the game and the rule are characterized by their arbitrariness. The rule claims no justification beyond its immediate appearance. It does not profess to represent a higher religious order or rational principle. In this way the rule is purely immanent to the game. Furthermore, the rule tells the subject engaged in the game what to do and not to do, but it does not give him [them] any reasons why he [they] should follow the rule. When asked, the rule provides no other justification for itself than the mere reference to the game itself: “Because these are the rules of the game!” Baudrillard sums up the difference between the rule and the law: “The Rule plays on an immanent sequence of arbitrary signs, while the Law is based on a transcendent sequence of necessary signs.”4

Think of the very simple game you can play when walking on the street in which you are not allowed to step on the lines between the flags of the pavement. The game is instituted by the invocation of the rule “Don’t step on the lines!” This rule is purely arbitrary. The game could be played just as well with the complete opposite rule: “You must step on a line for every single step you take!” Furthermore, the rule gives no reason that it should be followed. It has no “formal, moral or psychological structure or superstructure”5 to support its functioning. The functioning of the game is dependent on the voluntary submission to the rule by the players engaging in the game.

Compare this to the traffic regulations prescribed by law: “Don’t walk in the street.” “Cross the street only at the green light.” These regulations apply unconditionally and must be obeyed by anyone regardless of whether he wants [they want] to or not. Traffic regulations come with a series of explicit and implicit reasons why they should be followed, for instance, that they secure the social order of the traffic situation for the safety of everyone.

The transcendence of law makes the validity of law unconditional. It is not up to the individual subject of law to decide whether he wants to submit to the law or not. Conversely, the purely arbitrary character of the rule sets free the subject and leaves it up to the individual whether he [they] wants to participate in the game and become obliged by the rules of the game or not. In Homo Ludens Huizinga indeed proposes voluntariness and freedom as the first in his list of characteristics of play.6

“because it’s fun”

Law as understood by Baudrillard **not only constitutes society**. In the psychoanalytic tradition that Baudrillard is drawing on, law also plays a **crucial role** in the **very constitution of the subject**. To **be a subject** is to **be subject to law**. Without law, **there would be no subject**.

At first glance, law manifests itself as a **prohibition** banning our access to certain objects and acts. We may think of the law as an institution necessary in order to **discipline** our **wild** and **otherwise uncontrolled desires** for different forbidden things such as other people’s property (Thou shalt not steal) or transgressive sexual acts (Thou shalt not commit adultery). In this line of thinking, a society without law would be an anarchical allagainst-all with everybody satisfying her every desire at the expense of everybody else.

However, working along similar lines as Baudrillard, Zizek argues that law has also the latent function of **structuring our very being as subjects** since the law is what **institutes our desires in the first place**. When the law tells us **not to do this or that**, it carries an **underlying fantasmatic message** promising that **beyond the prohibition of the law** lie the objects that may **satisfy the desire** of the subject. **Inherent** in the law is the fantasy of **what might happen if the law was not there** to prevent me from pursuing my immediate desires.

As was the case with the concept of law, it is important to note that the concept of fantasy differs from its usual meaning. Here is how Zizek explains the term:

Fantasy is usually c]onceived as a scenario that realizes the subject’s desire. This elementary definition is quite adequate, on condition that we take it literally, what the fantasy stages is not a scene in which our desire is fulfilled, fully satisfied, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes, stages, the desire as such. The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is **not something given in advance**, but something that **has to be constructed**—and it is **precisely the role of fantasy** to **give the coordinates** of the subject’s desire, to **specify its object**, to **locate the position** the subject assumes in it. It is **only through fantasy** that the subject is **constituted as desiring**: through fantasy, we **learn how to desire**.7

Based on this understanding, Zizek often uses the concept of fantasy in conjunction with the concept of ideology.8 Only on a very superficial level is fantasy opposed to law in the sense that we fantasize about the transgression or even the abolition of law. We might think here of consumerist fantasies of the kind where we imagine gaining access to products that we cannot afford to buy: “If only the law of property or the law of equivalences did not prevent me from having this sweater or that car I would . . .” On another level, fantasy and law work together in structuring the desire of the subject. By restraining the subject’s access to the objects of desire designated by fantasy, law prevents the subject from realizing that the qualities and possibilities for enjoyment imagined to belong to the object are in fact projections of the subject’s own fantasy. In this way, the different laws of the market restraining our access to consumer goods are the condition of possibility for the fantasmatic projections about the amount of happiness, enjoyment, and fulfillment we would attain if we had free and unlimited access to these goods.

The idea of law instituting order in an otherwise anarchical world of unrestrained desire (e.g., in Hobbes) is actually a myth produced in the domain of fantasy and ideology. First, the myth **gives legitimacy to law** by explaining **why it is necessary**, but second and perhaps more importantly the myth tells us **what we would really want** if it were not for the law restraining us. Thus, the message of the law is **split** into the **explicit prohibition** and the **fantasmatic injunction** to transgress the law.9 In this way law interacts with fantasy in the domain of ideology in order to teach the subject what and how to desire.

An important implication of this understanding of the relation between fantasy and law is that even in transgression, the subject does not move beyond the domain of law. A thief illegally appropriating consumer goods by transgressing the law of property does not violate the fundamental principles for the structuring of desire in the consumer society. It may in fact even be argued that his transgressive act confirms the desirability of the consumer goods. Since the thief will go to such extremities in order to attain the goods, the goods must indeed be something extraordinary.

In Baudrillard’s analysis of the difference between law and rule, we find the following reflection related to transgression: Ordinarily we live within the realm of the Law, even when fantasizing its abolition. Beyond the law we see only its transgression or the lifting of a prohibition. For the discourse of law and interdiction determines the inverse discourse of transgression and liberation. However, it is not the absence of the law that is opposed to the law, but the Rule.10

Instead of transgression or absence of law, Baudrillard suggests the rule as being opposed to law. The argument is here not that by following the rule of the game, the player is violating the law of society. The point is rather the much more subtle one that by entering the sphere of the rule and the game the player moves beyond the ideological domain of the law.

Law, desire, and subjectivity tie into each other in a kind of Gordian knot. In the game, where law is substituted for the rule, this knot is cut. In its explicit contingency, the rule is not supported by fantasy. The rule does not hold a promise of satisfaction; no sublime object is imagined beyond the rule. The rule claims to be nothing more than what it is.

So what is the attraction of the rule and the game, if not satisfaction of a desire? Entering the game means voluntarily submitting to an arbitrary rule with no higher meaning. This act is, however, a way of delivering oneself from the law. Since transgression is already inscribed in the law even in the violation of a prohibition, we are still caught in the web of the law and its matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. In the violation, we may contradict the explicit word of the law but we are still confirming its underlying principle of desire.

When choosing to submit to the rules of a game, however, we step into another order not structured by the law and desire. We renounce our desire, not in an ascetic abstinence from particular objects of desire (which is by the way only an extreme sublimation of the objects of desire), but by letting ourselves be seduced into an order not promising any kind of satisfaction at all. In this way, we move beyond the law’s matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. When obeying the law, our conscious rational belief in it is supported by an unacknowledged irrational belief. Yet, entering the game, we openly acknowledge the pure contingency of the rule, and so our conscious submission to it is based on no belief whatsoever. We have no illusions that the game is nothing but an illusion, and so our approach to the game is perhaps more “realistic” than our approach to the law.

The game’s sole principle . . . is that by choosing the rule one is delivered from the law. Without a psychological or metaphysical foundation, the rule has no grounding in belief. One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule—one observes it. The diffuse sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved in the game. Hence their immorality: to proceed without believing in it, to sanction a direct fascination with conventional signs and groundless rules.11

In the game, desire is suspended and so is desire’s eternal shadow figure, unsatisfaction, which is a necessary condition for the reproduction of desire. In the game, there is no promise and therefore no disappointment. In the order of the law, we may find enjoyment in the momentary and partial satisfaction of our desires through obtainment of different objects. The joy of the game stems not from this kind of satisfaction but exactly from the suspension of the satisfaction/unsatisfaction matrix.

In order to understand the intensity of ritual forms, one must rid oneself of the idea that all happiness derives from nature, and all pleasure from the satisfaction of a desire. On the contrary, games, the sphere of play, reveal a passion for rules, a giddiness born of rules, and a force that comes from ceremony, and not desire.12

As an equivalent to the “giddiness” of which Baudrillard speaks here, we find in Huizinga’s characteristic of play the notion of “fun.” People play games because it is fun. Rather than providing a full and conclusive explanation for the engagement in games, the concept of fun seems to mark the limitation of such an explanation. “The fun of playing,” Huizinga notes, “resists all analysis, all logical interpretation.”13

Think again of the game Don’t Step on the Lines. Why would someone engage in this game? Why would someone chose to submit himself to the stupid and completely arbitrary rule of not stepping on the lines? In the obvious absence of sanctions, potential rewards or other kinds of meaningful satisfactions, the question can only be answered: “Because it’s fun.” This, however, is probably more of a displacement of the question than an actual answer.

In the tradition of psychoanalysis, we find also the concept of drive. Drive is opposed to desire insofar as desire is focused on a particular object imagined to provide satisfaction for the desire, whereas drive is not directed at any object. Drive is a short circuit unmediated by fantasy, where the joy of an act derives from the activity of acting itself. Here is how Zizek defines the difference between drive and desire:

Drive . . . stands for the paradoxical possibility that the subject, forever prevented from achieving his Goal (and thus fully satisfying his desire), can nevertheless find satisfaction in the very circular movement of repeatedly missing its object, of circulating around it.14

The point is here of course that the concept of drive as opposed to desire provides an account of fun as opposed to the meaning of ordinary goal-oriented behavior. Here is how the distinction between goal-oriented desire and self-propelling drive turns out in the words of the legendary poker player Nick “The Greek” Dandalos: “The next best thing to gambling and winning is gambling and losing.”15

game as parody

We have seen that the rule is opposed to the law and that the choice of the rule delivers the player from the ideology of law. What does this say about the relation between game and society? We might for a brief moment be tempted to proclaim the playing of games as an act of criticism toward the ideology of society. This, however, would be jumping ahead, and it would fit very badly with the actual position held by different games in our society. How would we think, for instance, of Champions League football as a form of resistance toward society? Furthermore, our analysis has just shown that the domain of the rule and fun is characterized by arbitrariness and absence of meaning. Hence, it would be contradictory to project a certain critical and normative intentionality into the mere engagement in a game.

At the same time, the analyses carried out in this book are motivated by the assumption that there is indeed some kind of sociologically significant relation between the games played in society and society as a whole. This assumption is shared by Huizinga, whom we have already quoted saying: “All play means something.”16 In order to avoid the pitfalls of formally fixating the normativity of the meaning of games in relation to society by making general statements such as: “games constitute a critique of the ideology of society,” “games constitute a celebration of societal values,” “games constitute a way of governing the subjects of society,” “games constitute a way of opposing dominant power structures of society,” and so on, we shall once again turn to Baudrillard for conceptual support:

The rule functions as the parodic simulacrum of the law. Neither an inversion nor subversion of the law, but its reversion in simulation. The pleasure of the game is twofold: the invalidation of time and space within the enchanted sphere of an indestructible form of reciprocity—pure seduction—and the parodying of reality, the formal outbidding of the law’s constraints.17

Insofar as the game emerges as the institution of an extra set of rules governing the subject, it seems to constitute an addition to the order of the law. Perhaps the social significance of the game lies, however, in the subtraction of fantasmatic ideology from the prescriptions of law. On an immediate level, the rules of a game look like the law of society. The rule “Don’t step on the lines” looks like the regulation “Only walk on a green light.” However, on closer inspection the rule lacks the fantasmatic support of ideology. The game thus presents the rule in its naked arbitrariness.

To the extent that the rules of a game carry some similarity to particular laws of society, the institution of the game may affect and transform our view of the particular law. The subtraction of ideology in the game may make us aware of the ideological dimension of the law, thus causing us to view the law in the same “naked arbitrariness” as the rule.

According to Zizek, any law is inherently contradictory and basically founded on a violent and illegitimate move in which law constitutes itself as law. The obvious example here is of course the allegedly humanistic laws of democracy, which are founded on the cruel, violent, and anything but democratic brutality of the French Revolution. Underneath the surface of the normal, rational, legitimate, universal law lies a traumatic truth about the abnormal, irrational, illegitimate, contingent foundation of the law, and for law to function this traumatic truth must remain concealed. Zizek states: “Every reign of law has its hidden roots in such an absolute—selfreferential, self-negating—crime by means of which crime assumes the form of law, and if the law is to reign in its ‘normal’ form, this reverse must be unconditionally repressed.”18 The function of ideology is to conceal the traumatic contradictions of law in order for law to function in a smooth and orderly fashion.

When the rule, in the words of Baudrillard, functions as the parodic simulacrum of the law, it simulates the law in the context of the play world. Since the play world is devoid of the fantasmatic projections of ideology, the rule stands forth in a more “naked” appearance than the way we are used to seeing the law. The rule of the game mimics law. It does not pretend to be law. In fact, the rule does not pretend to be anything more or less than what it is.

Given that the rule is conventional and arbitrary, and has no hidden truth, it knows neither repression nor the distinction between the manifest and the latent. It does not carry any meaning, it does not lead anywhere; by contrast, the Law has a determinate finality.19

The absence of any kind of justification or rationalization transcending the rule produces a vacuum around the game. Contrary to the laws of the social order, the game does not explain or account for itself. It merely offers itself. Consequently, the game does not pass any critical or normative judgment on the law and society. However, the vacuum produced by the rule— the space devoid of ideology constituted by the game—opens the potential for critical reflections on the nature of law and society. Indeed, these reflections cannot be made from within the game. The game merely opens the space for such reflections.

# 1NR

## DA---Cap Good

### t/l

#### Impact framing - default to utilitarianism

Greene 2010 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Nuclear war is a form of intense structural violence

Jacqueline Foertsch 13. Professor of English at the University of North Texas. 08/30/2013. Reckoning Day: Race, Place, and the Atom Bomb in Postwar America. Vanderbilt University Press.

More broadly speaking, one’s location in the American landscape when the bomb exploded—that is, during America’s early atomic/cold war era—intersects with one’s “place” in the American social hierarchy in significant ways. For the bomb presented Americans, especially those who have always enjoyed more freedom of movement, with a series of spatio-ethical dilemmas: where to go if the bombs should fall, who and what to leave behind. While the suburban boom of the immediate postwar period had myriad causes, one significant reason was the strong sense that America’s cities were the easiest and most likely of nuclear targets. Elaine Tyler May has examined the leafy, low-slung, spread-out qualities of American suburbs and has persuasively observed in these a response to atomic fears of urban verticality, congestion, and entrapment. For May it was especially the hunkered down, ranch-style home that “exuded this sense of isolation, privacy, and containment” (94). In atomic fictions of the period, the city is depicted as the site of conflagration; those characters lucky enough to find themselves in the suburbs or on the farm on “X-day” fare better and depend less on which way the wind blows during the fallout period. While the suburban choice—again, for the white middle-class, for whom such choices were exclusively provided—seemed obvious, the decision with respect to whether or not to go underground, to build a bomb shelter and prepare to survive there in the atomic aftermath, was always a more fraught proposition. In the enmeshed social setting of the suburbs, how would it look to build a shelter when no one else was doing so? Kenneth D. Rose suggests that the lone suburban shelter-digger might seem not only eccentric (violating the cardinal rule of conformity) but also “immoral.” “At issue,” says Rose, “was controlling entry to one’s personal or community shelter . . . to keep out radioactive fallout but also ‘to prevent exceeding the maximum capacity of the shelter’” (93). How did one build to suit one’s immediate family but not spaciously enough to include neighbors and passersby, or even parents, in-laws, aunts, and uncles from the “old country” (i.e., the urban birthplace)? The pointlessness of resurfacing in a ruined, depopulated post-nuclear environment may have dissuaded many from taking the plunge in the first place; others sought the furthest reaches of American civilization (and beyond) in their understanding that the key to nuclear survival was location, location, location. We attach extremist notions like nuclear survivalism to a specific racial, classed position in the US—white (sometimes white-supremacist) lower-class place-holders who take to the hinterlands in order to reject not only the nuclear jeopardy in which America has placed its citizens from the cold war to the present but also much of what America represents (see, e.g., “Religious Group”). Such outward-boundedness positions one near the bottom of America’s social scale, while downward-boundedness (bomb shelter-building) was a distinctly suburban (and, to some degree, urban) phenomenon and thus associated with America’s middle class. In short, there was less stigma attached during the cold war to digging down than to lighting out, despite the seemingly more bizarre nature of the downward-digging: while survivalists thrive on the US’s geographic and ideological margins into the twenty-first century, today no middle-class suburbanite would construct a bomb shelter in his backyard, so unorthodox an act would it be, and the two-hour commute has become more and more the norm. Perhaps, sixty years ago, a move to the suburbs was deemed so eminently respectable that included with the purchase of one’s private lot was the right to go a little crazy in one’s fenced-off backyard—to prepare for a post-nuclear life underground no matter how objectionable it was to some. In America’s “burnt out,” “bombed out” urban cores, locales we have tagged with post-nuclear adjectives since the postwar period,1 remained America’s “undesirables”—African, Asian, and Latino Americans and other ethnic persons or immigrants with low incomes; poor whites; the elderly; gays and lesbians; the mentally disturbed; the otherwise socially delinquent. Ironically, their lives in inner city high-rises positioned these postwar Americans “at the top,” while everyone understood that such physical superiority carried neither privilege nor security. If anything, the last place one wanted to be at this moment was up, and yet this particular sector of the American population had few other choices: the suburbs were closed to them, rural ties had been severed generations earlier, and the atomic threat found many of America’s persons of color trapped at ground zero. Questioning “the Negro’s relative exposure and immunity to nuclear annihilation” for Negro Digest in 1963, the sociologist and black studies founder Nathan Hare praised African Americans’ emotional fortitude and resistance to physical travails—even the anticipated intense heat of atomic blast—due to their “cotton-chopping, cotton-picking backgrounds in the Southern sun and long years of tending ovens and furnaces in white kitchens and factories” (31). Yet Hare is intent on critiquing the demographic patterns of postwar society that have trapped the black community in northern ghettoes “near the centers or bull’s-eyes of our big cities” (28). Citing racial residency patterns at that point, Hare notes that “a 10-megaton bomb on Washington, DC, or Chicago . . . would just about take care of the Negro community” (29). Hare’s observations are echoed today by Katherine McKittrick and Clyde Woods, who decry America’s long history of “uneven geographies,” wherein “black and poor subjects are disposable precisely because they cannot move or escape” (3). This insight crystallizes the crisis faced by atomic-era African Americans, thought to deserve their fate for failing to meet the criteria for admission to the suburban safe haven. Philip Wylie’s novel Tomorrow! is a nuclear preparedness/survival fantasy that includes a map of the fictional sister cities that are its setting; these surround a “Negro District” that is dead-center during the climactic nuclear explosion. The story ends with its surviving characters, all of whom are white, viewing a scene of pristine, suburban-style rebirth. This vision resonates with those of postwar urban planners who could not but associate the bomb, despite its frightening implications, with their growing desire to revamp city life, specifically to “save the American city from ‘the blight . . . gnawing at its innards’” (qtd. in P. Boyer 152). The National Paint, Varnish, and Lacquer Association produced a fright-mongering public service announcement in the mid-1950s that has achieved cult status in the intervening decades, The House in the Middle. As it opens, a disgusted narrator harangues against the combustible trash and rotting wood “you’ve seen in too many alleys and backyards—in slum areas” and crows about the destruction suffered by cluttered, littered, unpainted frame houses subjected to H-bombing at the Nevada Proving Grounds, images of which accompany his voiceover. Only the paint job of the lucky middle house saves it from the same fate, itself racialized, since “light colors” and “white” are recommended as the most light- and heat-reflective shades. Implicit in such texts, therefore, are visions of the nuclear-induced “urban renewal” that recent thinkers such as Martha A. Bartter and Dean MacCannell have broadly denounced, while Michele Birnbaum incisively reads the constructedness of racial identity thus: “we can describe one [race] only in terms of the other—a kind of Heisenberg principle of race in which racial difference is situational, provisional: it depends upon who is looking and who is next to whom” (3). As whiteness depends for its significance upon its position with respect to blackness (and vice versa), we see this supplemental relation repeated in the demographic shifting of the postwar US: African Americans, forced to remain in rapidly declining inner cities, maintained these locales as viable (i.e., populated) nuclear targets, creating in turn the relative safety of the “uninhabited” white suburban sanctuary.

### impact

#### economic decline causes nuclear war

Mann 14 [Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>]

#### The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance.

### at: sustainability

#### Creative destruction builds resilience into the system preventing future crises

Balland et al. 15

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In a global context of financial turmoil, rising inequality and environmental uncertainty, the question of how cities overcome crises has become increasingly prominent on the scientific and political agenda. Understanding urban resilience requires a dynamic view of the economic structure of cities and questions simple logics of urban development as a finite process. By asking how cities continuously re-invent themselves and create new growth paths, we challenge urban policy to explore geographies of creative-destruction in which sustained growth rests upon the abandonment of obsolete sectors, modes of work organization and institutional practices.

Cities that fail to adapt and change, those that get locked-in to specific practices, ultimately decline. Resilient cities, on the contrary, are able to maintain their essential functionality through short-run shocks and over the long run. For many cities this functionality has evolved over time. Once sites of protection for the local population, cities today play a critical role as centers of knowledge production and innovation. As they agglomerate in space, individuals and firms exchange information, learn from each other and recombine knowledge more easily. Major technological-hubs in the United States such as San José, Boston and Austin host large numbers of creative individuals and are responsible for a large share of the nation’s new technologies. These cities are also among the richest, fastest growing metropolitan areas of the country.

We make use of patent data to explore the technological resilience of U.S. cities. The data produced by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) includes all utility patents and identifies the names of inventors and the nature of new technologies along with information on the geography and history of knowledge production. The patent data are used to define technological crises as periods of sustained negative growth in patenting activity. Analysis of patented inventions in metropolitan areas from 1975 to 2005 shows that the frequency, intensity and duration of technological crises vary considerably across American cities. Why? Why are some cities almost always in crisis while others manage to avoid periods of decline? Why do some cities suffer more than others when hit by a shock? And why do some cities recover much faster from crisis than others?

Differences in the vulnerability and the response of cities to technological crises can be explained to a large extent by differences in their socio-economic flexibility. The most important factor here is technological flexibility. Technological flexibility indicates how well the skills of inventors in a city can be redeployed to new technological activities (those not yet developed in the city). Technological flexibility provides a measure of the potential reconfiguration of local technological skills and assets, a measure of the relative ease with which a city might adjust or adapt its technological portfolio in the face of shocks that might render parts of that portfolio less competitive. Cities with more technological flexibility have a higher tendency to avoid crises and a greater capacity to limit the intensity and duration of crisis events.

Other socio-economic dimensions such as network flexibility and institutional flexibility seem to be less important. Network flexibility indicates how dependent inventors of a given cities are on inventors located in other cities. If knowledge can easily be accessed from different external sources, the city has high network flexibility. Institutional flexibility is based on the enforceability of non-competition agreements. Non-competition agreements are legal contracts that prevent the workers of one firm from joining a rival firm, including spin-offs that they might form themselves. As a result, non-competition agreements can reduce labor mobility and knowledge flows within cities, further reducing the capacity to adapt and change.


So what makes American cities resilient over time? An important element of response is that cities need a flexible socio-economic structure – in terms of skills, networks and institutions – to “re-invent” themselves and move from declining to emerging technological activities. Flexible socio-economic structures prevent lock-in by providing room for the process of creative destruction underlying urban resilience. This approach deeply challenges our understanding of the role of urban policy. If resilient cities are characterized by an intense process of creative-destruction, then sustained periods of growth require active transition policy to replace traditional jobs, sectors and technologies with new activities. This transition, by nature, conflicts with the interests of individuals and organizations in incumbent technologies or industries, as we witness today with the rise of the sharing economy.

In their fight for survival existing organizations might seek refuge through policy protections that are likely to slow adaptation and that may weaken the long-run resilience of cities. The challenge for policy-makers then is the creation of the set of institutions that provide and nurture spaces of urban creativity that build upon the sets of competencies and skills that are accumulated in cities ensuring that continual innovation supports growth for broad coalitions of economic agents.

#### Capitalism solves domestic and global poverty – *you need wealth before you can redistribute it*.

\*Great indict of Teen Vogue

Pethokoukis ’18 (James; a columnist and policy analyst, is the Dewitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; October 18th; “Ending poverty by ‘ending capitalism’ is absolute nonsense. Just so, so wrong”; <http://www.aei.org/publication/ending-poverty-by-ending-capitalism-is-absolute-nonsense-just-so-so-wrong/>; accessed 1/12/19; MSCOTT)



It’s hardly to Teen Vogue’s credit that its dreadful story “[What ‘Capitalism’ Is and How It Affects People](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-capitalism-is?mbid=social_twitter)” isn’t nearly as wrongheaded and offensive as the viral [tweet](https://twitter.com/TeenVogue/status/1052641654367313921) promoting it: “Can’t [#endpoverty](https://twitter.com/hashtag/endpoverty?src=hash)without ending capitalism!” But let’s start with the grotesque, clickbaity tweet. End poverty where, exactly? Is Teen Vogue referring to the United States, which it identifies as an example of a “modern capitalist” country along with Britain and Germany? First of all, the median income of the bottom 20 percent of households is up more than 70 percent since 1979 in real terms, according to the [CBO](https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53597). More to the point, poverty in America has declined considerably since LBJ declared a War on Poverty in 1964. Like other advanced capitalist economies, the United States redistributes some of its massive, market-generated wealth to improve living standards at the bottom. According to the Census Bureau’s [Supplemental Poverty Measure](https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-265.html) — which unlike the official poverty measure takes into account key safety net programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program — the poverty rate fell to 13.9 percent in 2017 from 26 percent in 1967. There’s even better news when one looks at “consumption-based” poverty measures, which calculates what a family consumes instead of how much income it earns. The work of visiting AEI scholar Bruce Meyer (along with his colleague James Sullivan) finds consumption-based poverty [is more like 3 percent](http://www.aei.org/publication/annual-report-on-us-consumption-poverty-2016/). Here is a relevant bit from a recent [podcast chat](http://www.aei.org/publication/inequality-and-poverty-in-the-us-a-long-read-qa-with-bruce-meyer/) we had: Pethokoukis: Correct me if I have the numbers wrong, but if you look at just the official poverty rate measure you hear about in the news, since 1980 it seems kind of flat. But if you look at consumption, poverty has gone down fairly considerably. Is that right? Meyer: Yes, so one of the statistics that I like least and I think is most misleading is the poverty rate. The official poverty rate says that we are at the same level of poverty now as we were in the 70s, which just does not fit. Pethokoukis: So the Great Society failed, we spent all this money and poverty is no better. Meyer: That’s essentially what the official statistics say, but you shouldn’t believe them for two main reasons. First, the official statistics don’t count much of what we’ve done to reduce poverty; so the official statistics look at pre-tax money income which omits the earned income tax credit, which omits food stamps, it omits housing benefits, it omits Medicaid. So, it gives you a very distorted picture of how those at the bottom are doing. The second big reason that the official poverty statistic completely misleads the people taking them at face value is that the thresholds above which you have to be to not be poor go up too fast over time because they are indexed to inflation in a way that overstates the effects of inflation. And you can see that again if you look at material circumstances in more objective ways of those at the bottom. If you look at the housing conditions of the bottom 20% of the income distribution, they look like the housing conditions of the middle class 30 years ago. So, the rates of air conditioning, central air conditioning, of washers and dryers in the apartment, have gone way up. The incidents of peeling paint, of water leaks in the ceiling or in the pipes, and the like have gone way down. Pethokoukis: When I think about the house I grew up in, it was about half the size of my current house, it had no air conditioning, and I remember the leaks in the ceilings. I certainly am sure that my parents considered us a solidly middle-class household. But I guarantee if I drove by that house with my kids, they would say, “We didn’t know you were so poor.” Meyer: I think that’s exactly right. I think that’s what a lot of us can see in how our lives have changed, but the official statistics don’t really reflect that, in significant part because of the overstatement of inflation and because of the omission of in-kind transfers and other government benefits. And if Teen Vogue doesn’t understand what’s happening in the US, maybe it’s really too much to ask that it understand global trends, like the historic massive reduction in global poverty over recent decades. ([Most Americans have no idea](http://www.aei.org/publication/extreme-poverty-declining-americans-have-no-idea/).) Over the past 30 years, the share of our fellow humans living in extreme poverty has decreased to 21 percent from 52 percent. That’s a billion fewer people in extreme poverty, largely in China and India. The Economist magazine — a publication quite willing to address flaws in the world’s capitalist economies — has put it this way: The world’s achievement in the field of poverty reduction is, by almost any measure, impressive. . . . Most of the credit, however, must go to capitalism and free trade, for they enable economies to grow — and it was growth, principally, that has eased destitution. The world now knows how to reduce poverty. A lot of targeted policies — basic social safety nets and cash-transfer schemes help. So does binning policies like fuel subsidies to Indonesia’s middle class and China’s hukou household-registration system that boost inequality. But the biggest poverty-reduction measure of all is liberalizing markets to let poor people get richer. That means freeing trade between countries (Africa is still cruelly punished by tariffs) and within them (China’s real great leap forward occurred because it allowed private business to grow). Both India and Africa are crowded with monopolies and restrictive practices. Many Westerners have reacted to recession by seeking to constrain markets and roll globalization back in their own countries, and they want to export these ideas to the developing world, too. It does not need such advice. It is doing quite nicely, largely thanks to the same economic principles that helped the developed world grow rich and could pull the poorest of the poor out of destitution. You’ll find none of the above in the Teen Vogue piece, which means they’ve missed the story. Totally. Modern advanced economies — whether America, Sweden, the UK, or Germany — combine market-driven economies with social safety nets of one flavor or another. The result is high living standards and a low poverty level. But you can’t redistribute wealth without creating it. And that is what innovation-driven capitalism has done really well for the past two centuries. I would urge Teen Vogue editors and reporters to read “[Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World–and Why Things Are Better Than You Think](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0756J1LLV/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1)” by the late Hans Rosling, a fantastic book which examines all the ways in which very smart people are getting so many important things so very wrong — including poverty. Hard to believe this story has been up since April without any apparent modification.

#### Growth is environmentally sustainable

Bailey ’16 (Ronald; 12/16/16; B.A. in Philosophy and B.A. Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Economic Growth Environmentally Sustainable?” <http://reason.com/archives/2016/12/16/is-economic-growth-environmentally-sust1)>

Is economic growth environmentally sustainable? No, say a group of prominent ecological economists led by the Australian hydrologist James Ward. In a new PLoS ONE article—"Is Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible?"—they offer an analysis inspired by the 1972 neo-Malthusian classic The Limits to Growth. They even suggest that The Limits to Growth's projections with regard to population, food production, pollution, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources are still on track. In other words, they think we're still heading for a collapse. I think **they're wrong**. But they're wrong in an instructive way. The authors describe two types of "decoupling," relative and absolute. Relative decoupling means that economic growth increases faster than rates of growth in material and energy **consumption** and **environmental impact**. Between 1990 and 2012, for example, China's **GDP rose 20-fold** while its energy use increased by a factor of four and its material use by a factor of five. Basically this entails increases in efficiency that result in using fewer resources to produce more value. Absolute decoupling is what happens when continued economic growth actually **lessens resource use** and impacts on the natural environment, that is, creating more value while using less stuff. Essentially humanity becomes richer while withdrawing from nature. To demonstrate that continued economic growth is unsustainable, the authors recycle the hoary I=PAT model devised in 1972 by the Stanford entomologist and population alarmist Paul Ehrlich and the Harvard environmental policy professor (and chief Obama science adviser) John Holdren. Human Impact on the environment is supposed to equal to Population x Affluence/consumption x Technology. All of these are presumed to intensify and worsen humanity's impact on the natural world. In Ward and company's updated version of I=PAT, the sustainability of economic growth largely depends on Technology trends. Absolute decoupling from resource consumption or pollutant emissions requires technological intensity of use and emissions to decrease by at least the same annual percentage as the economy is growing. For example, if the economy is growing at three percent per year, technological intensity must reduce 20-fold over 100 years to maintain steady levels of resource consumption or emissions. If technological intensity is faster then resource use and emissions will decline over time, which would result in greater wealth creation with ever lessening resource consumption and environmental spillovers. Once they've set up their I=PAT analysis, Ward and his colleagues assert that "for non-substitutable resources such as land, water, raw materials and energy, we argue that whilst efficiency gains may be possible, there are minimum requirements for these resources that are ultimately governed by physical realities." Among the "physical realities" they mention are limits on plant photosynthesis, the conversion efficiencies of plants into meat, the amount of water needed to grow crops, that all supposedly determine the amount of agricultural land required to feed humanity. They also cite "the upper limits to energy and material efficiencies govern minimum resource throughput required for economic production." To illustrate the operation of their version of the I=PAT equation, they apply it to a recent study that projected it would be possible for Australia's economy to grow 7-fold while simultaneously reducing resource and energy use and lowering environmental pressures through 2050. They **crank the notion** that there are nonsubstitutable physical limits on material and energy resources through their equations until 2100, and they find that eventually consumption of both rise at the same rate as economic growth. QED: Economic growth is unsustainable. Or as they report, "Permanent decoupling (absolute or relative) is impossible for essential, non-substitutable resources because the efficiency gains are ultimately governed by physical limits." **Malthus wins again!** Or does he? GDP growth—increases in the monetary value of all finished goods and services—is a crude measure for improvements in human well-being. Nevertheless, rising incomes (GDP per capita) correlate with lots of good things that nearly everybody wants, including access to more and better **food**, longer and **healthier lives**, more educational **opportunities**, and greater scope for life choices. Ward and his colleagues are clearly right that there is only so much physical stuff on the Earth, but even they know that wealth is not created simply by using more stuff. Where they go wrong (as so many Malthusians do) is by implicitly assuming that there are limits to human creativity. Interestingly, Ward and his colleagues, like Malthus before them, focus on the supposed limits to **agricultural productivity**. For example, they cite the limits to photosynthesis, which will limit the amount of food that humanity can produce. But as they acknowledge, human population may not continue to increase. In fact, **global fertility rates** have been **decelerating** for many decades now, and demographer Wolfgang Lutz calculates that world population will peak after the middle of this century and begin falling. Since the number of mouths to feed will stabilize and people can eat only so much, it is unlikely that the **biophysical limits** of agriculture on Earth will be exceeded. But it gets even better. Agricultural **productivity is improving**. Consider the biophysical limit on photosynthesis cited by the study. In fact, researchers are already making progress on installing more efficient C-4 photosynthesis into rice and wheat, which would **boost yields by** as much as **50 percent**. British researchers just announced that they had figured out how to boost photosynthetic efficiency to create a super-wheat would increase yields by 20 percent. In a 2015 article for the Breakthrough Journal, "The Return of Nature: How Technology Liberates the Environment," Jesse H. Ausubel of Rockefeller University reviews how humanity is **already decoupling** in many ways from the natural world. "A series of 'decouplings' is occurring, so that our economy no longer advances in tandem with exploitation of land, forests, water, and minerals," he writes. "American use of almost everything except information **seems to be peaking**." He notes that agricultural applications of fertilizer and water in the U.S. peaked in the 1980s while yields continued to increase. Thanks to increasing agricultural productivity, humanity is already at **"peak farmland"**; as a result, "an area the size of India or of the United States east of the Mississippi could be released globally from agriculture over the next 50 years or so." Ward is worried about biophysical limits on water use. But as Ausubel notes, U.S. **water use has peaked** and has declined **below the level of 1970**. What about meat? Ausubel notes the **greater efficiency** with which chickens and cultivated fish turn grains and plant matter into meat. In any event, the future of farming is not fields but factories. Innovators are already seeking to replace the entire dairy industry with milk, yogurt, and cheeses made by genetically modified bacteria grown in tanks. Others are figuring how to culture meat in vat. Ausubel also notes that many countries have already been through or are about to enter the "forest transition," in which forests begin to expand. Roger Sedjo, a forest economist at Resources of the Future, has projected that by the middle of this century most of world's **industrial wood** will be produced from planted forests covering a remarkably small land area, perhaps **only 5 to 10 percent** of the extent of today's global forest. Shrinking farms and ranches and expanding forests will do a lot toward turning around the alarming global reduction in wildlife. How about unsubstitutable stuff? Are we running out of that? Ausubel notes that the U.S. has apparently already achieved **absolute decoupling**—call it peak stuff—for a lot of materials, including plastics, paper, timber, phosphate, aluminum, steel, and copper. And he reports relative decoupling for **53** other **commodities**, all of which are likely heading toward absolute decoupling. Additive manufacturing is also known as 3-D printing, in which machines build up new items one layer at a time. The Advanced Manufacturing Office suggested that additive manufacturing can reduce material needs and costs by up to **90 percent**. And instead of the replacement of worn-out items, their material can **simply be recycled** through a printer to return it to good-as-new condition using only 2 to 25 percent of the energy required to make new parts. 3-D printing on demand will also eliminate storage and inventory costs, and will significantly cut transportation costs. Nanomanufacturing—building atom-by-atom—will likely engender a **fourth industrial revolution** by spurring exponential economic growth while reducing human demands for material resources. Ward and company project that Australians will be using 250 percent more energy by 2100. Is there an upper limit to energy production that implies unsustainability? In their analysis, the ecological economists apparently assume that energy supplies are limited. Why this is not clear, unless their model **implicitly assumes** a growing **consumption** of fossil fuels (and even then, the world is not close to running out of those). But there is a source of energy that, for all practical purposes, is limitless and has few deleterious environmental effects: **nuclear power**. If demand for primary energy were to double by 2050, a back-of-the-envelope calculation finds that the **entire world's energy needs** could be supplied by 6,000 conventional nuclear power plants. The deployment of fast reactors would supply "renewable" energy for thousands of years. The development of thorium reactors could also supply **thousands of years** of energy. And both could do so without harming the environment. (Waste heat at that scale would not be much of a problem.) Such power sources are in any relevant sense "decoupled" from the natural world, since their fuel cycles produce **little pollution**. Recall that GDP measures the monetary value of all finished goods and services. Finished goods will become a shrinking part of the world's economy as more people gain access to food, clothing, housing, transportation, and so forth. Already, services account for 80 percent of U.S. GDP and 80 percent of civilian employment. Instead of stuff, people will want to spend time creating and enjoying themselves. As technological progress enables economic growth, people will consume more pixels and less petroleum, more massages and less mortar, more handicrafts and less hardwood. Ultimately, Ward and his colleagues make the **same mistake as Malthus** and the Limits to Growth folks: They **extrapolate trends** without taking adequate account of human **ingenuity**. Will it be possible to grow the economy 7-fold over this century while reducing resource consumption and restoring the natural world? Yes.

#### Feedback effects and substitutes prevent every shortage

**Lynch 16** [Michael, President of Strategic Energy and Economic Consulting, Director of Asian Energy and Security at the Center for International Studies at MIT, and a Lecturer at Tufts and Vienna University, *The “peak oil” scare and the coming oil flood*, p. 63-74]

More recently, there has been a clamor about "peak everything" based on the idea that, well, everything is finite and we 're using it up, so it is "running out." Or at least, production must peak. Or, as one physicist [END OF PAGE 63] points out, eventually human energy production will generate as much heat as the sun does-eventually being 1400 years.¶ Flat Earth ¶ Colin Campbell, in the famed (well, famous in the IEA's offices) debate at the IEA in 1997, compared resource optimists to the conservative Spanish court that opposed the visionary, Columbus, and has since referred to those, like Adelman and me, who disagreed with him as "flat-earth economists." Albert Bartlett later explained that the term actually meant that economists thought the earth had two dimensions and thus was infinite, containing equivalently infinite resources.¶ But this description ignores two important variables: capital and knowledge. Additional investment can often increase the production of renewables like agricultural products and nonrenewables like minerals and oil in the same amount of space, as can better technology. Neo-Malthusians tend to ignore this factor and argue that the rate of technological advance (and greater scientific knowledge) has diminished or disappeared, as described in Chapter 7.¶ The argument is somewhat specious and relies in part the question of the finiteness of resources, discussed earlier-or a static measure of resources and dynamic view of consumption, as in The Limits to Growth. ¶ HOW LONG?¶ Perhaps the most important factor that raises skepticism is the fact that at least some exponential alarmists fear the distant future. Any number of pundits have looked at long-term forecasts of economic and/or technological development and characterized them as foolish. We have no flying cars, nuclear power is not too cheap to meter, and no one is eating Soylent Green. On the other hand, most of these were not serious forecasting efforts, but rather off-the-cuff remarks (or the equivalent), and those making them were not particularly serious about achieving them within a specific time frame. And we do eat Soylent Green already; only we call it tofu and vegemite. (Read the book, it wasn't people.)¶ NEWTON'S FIRST LAW¶ The biggest mistakes have come from an apparent source: extrapolation of a trend endlessly, as if there were no feedback or other variables [END PAGE 64] involved. Jay Forrester, the inventor of Systems Dynamics, which was used in The Limits to Growth model (and which I have used), reportedly once said that feedback effects tend to overwhelm the initial stimuli, which is probably true in many cases. Yet, many neo-Malthusians and especially peak oil advocates tend to extrapolate a given trend endlessly, assuming no feedback effect whatsoever.¶ Indeed, the first wave of peak oil advocates explicitly argued that no feedback effect would occur: prices didn't affect production or consumption levels. Technological advances were either unimportant or had ceased and so could not increase the resource base.¶ An important element of the fear of exponential growth is the analysts' choice of particularly high growth rates. As Figure 4.1 showed, Ehrlich chose the highest observed growth in the 20th century for his calculations, even though it represented the post-World War II baby boom and should have been considered an exception, not the norm. Similarly, Bartlett, writing in 1998, talks about the growth in oil demand from the 1950s and 1960s at 7 [percent] a year, which causes a doubling of use every decade, 25 which sounds alarming, given the arguments about the difficulty of making a speedy energy transition, until you realize that consumption growth dropped to 3% per year in the 1970s (a doubling time of 24 years), and under 1 [percent] per year in the 1980s (a doubling period of 75 years), before recovering to 1.5% in the seven years before his talk (48 years).¶ This emphasizes the lack of feedback mechanism used in these simplistic models and how important they are in the real world.¶ REAL SCARCITY¶ Indeed, the subtext of the fear of resource scarcity is that renewable resources have repeatedly been the source of problems. In Tainter's The Collapse of Complex Societies, he talks about resources as causing the fall of a number of (mostly) ancient civilizations; nearly all suffered from problems like lengthy droughts and salt buildup in irrigated farmland. 26¶ And similar problems continue today, especially if you consider endangered species, from rhinos to tuna. In all cases, these are renewable resources, the very ones that are NOT finite, that are sustainable, that we can rely on for all eternity-in theory. No lasting shortage of nonrenewable resources minerals and energy-has occurred since the advent of the global economy.

### at: democracy

#### Democracy is resilient and not correlated with peace

Michael **Mousseau 18**. Professor of International Relations Theory at the University of Central Florida. 2018, "Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace," SAGE Journals, <https://journals-sagepub-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894215616408>, accessed 3-4-2019//JDi

No one has challenged the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest nontrivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). **The only** matter in **controversy is whether democracy has any impact on peace** after consideration of contractualist economy. I investigated all five reasons offered in the literature (excluding already-refuted arguments) to think democracy causes peace, and found no support for any of them. The **correlation of democracy with peace is zero regardless of how** contractualist economy or interstate **conflict is measured**; the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy, and the state of knowledge offers no evidence of causation from democracy to contractualist economy and peace. While some correlation of democracy with peace appears in analyses of all disputes (at the 0.10 level), this appears to be a statistical artifact, since democracy is near zero in analyses of wars, fatal-only disputes (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013 and above), and militarized crises (Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Analyses of all-disputes are less accurate than those of fatal disputes and crises because they are more likely to include events that are not state-to-state confrontations, and more likely to under-report events occurring in clientelist dyads. We saw that clientelist democracies tend to be geographically dispersed, and this may account for the non-fatal peace, which does not exist in bordering dyads where everyone has an equal chance to fight. The non-fatal correlation of democracy with peace is also marginal, as we saw in Table 4 that it includes only 27% of dyads and only 50% of joint-democratic dyads. This study largely investigated unsupported assertions of fact and showed them to lack support: neither DOR nor Ray (2013) properly supported their claims that multiple imputation, the treatment of ongoing dispute years, an interaction, the adoption of an alternative measure for contractualist economy, or reverse causality actually restore the evidence for the democratic peace. In this way this study merely corroborated what was already the state of knowledge, and it would be a mistake to think there are continuing factual differences in this controversy. I cannot promise that the analyses herein are error free, and I fully expect defenders of the democratic peace to carefully scrutinize them for errors, but **no claim of error should be perceived as resurrecting the correlation of democracy with peace unless it is** also **shown to change results**. Nor has anyone disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in two studies (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a). While DOR (205) assert that the analyses in Mousseau (2009) are based on a misinterpreted interaction term, there is no such interaction term in Mousseau (2009). The only evidence-based defense of the democratic peace that exists today comes from DOR’s 120 regressions, 101 of which are invalid. Of the 19 valid ones, only 15 are of fatal disputes that count, and every one of these 15 regressions is mired by one of two questionable practices: five include control for the DemocracyH term that is said to artificially inflate the democracy coefficient; 10 are irrelevant because they include the inconsequential interaction term additionally calculated at the misleading 75th percentile of contractualist economy. **If there is a correlation of democracy with peace, why cannot this be shown in a clear-cut regression?** Beyond the facts, scientific assessment calls for acknowledgment of the imbalance of theory in this controversy. Economic norms theory does not deny the correlation of democracy with peace, and thus all prior evidence for it; rather, it offers a specific and falsifiable explanation for the correlation that identifies it as spurious. **Defenders of** the **democratic peace** are not putting forth a competing explanation for the correlation; rather, they **simply oppose the idea that democracy does not independently cause peace, with no reason** given for this opposition. However, democracy is not a random variable, so there are no scientific grounds that prohibit us from seeking to explain it, and there are no scientific grounds that preclude that whatever explains democracy cannot also explain the peace. Causality, not statistics, lies at the core of this controversy, and causality cannot be directly seen: it can only be theorized and corroborated. Yet **defenders of** the **democratic peace have not addressed any** of the **extensive corroborations of economic norms** theory **accrued in studies of civil conflict and** insurgency (Mousseau, 2012b), terrorism (Meierrieks 2012; Boehmer and Daube, 2013; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015), **democratization** (Aytacx et al., 2016), and human rights (Mousseau and Mousseau, 2008). The weight of evidence for economic norms theory overwhelms any theory of democracy causing peace (Ungerer, 2012), yet defenders of the proposition have sought only to report some statistically significant correlation of democracy with peace, as if correlation equals causation (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Nor is there any scientific basis for concluding that this controversy is ultimately unresolvable because the factors are closely related, as is frequently asserted without support (e.g. DOR: 203). The relevant factors are not closely related: contractualist economy is only moderately correlated with trade interdependence (0.31), income (0.71/0.56), and democracy (0.47) (Mousseau, 2013: 191–193). That contractualist nations are almost always democratic does not mean that democratic nations are almost always contractualist, and the majority 57% of democracies had clientelist economies from 1950 to 2010. **The notion that democracy, market development, and trade are synonymous is rooted in ignorance**, and ignorance cannot justify discarding, after the fact, our carefully constructed measures and datasets.13 The implications of this study are far from trivial: the democratic peace, defined as democracy causing peace, lacks the evidentiary core on which it is based; the observation of democratic peace is best explained by contract norms. If our field is to abide by scientific rules of evidence, then our scholars must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause, or correlate, of peace, and we must stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict. The variable to replace it is contractualist economy, which not only subsumes democracy but is now the most powerful non-trivial factor in the study of international conflict, whose impact is more than 10 times that which we once thought democracy had. No historical study is immune to criticism, but the progress of knowledge will not be furthered with another (third) round of ardently asserted claims of error that are not shown to change results. I understand the prior view of democratic peace is known and intuitive and the contractualist peace is less so, and unsupported assertions are enough for many to believe in already-known claims. However, the purpose of science is to promote rather than stifle innovation, and to differentiate good ideas from bad ones. Better yet are new ideas that can help make the world a better place, and economic norms theory is clear on that: if the wealthy market-oriented nations wish to advance democracy and peace around the world, the way to do that is to promote economic opportunity.